The expression “public order” was also discussed quite extensively in the Stateless Persons Conference. As mentioned above, the Danish representative implied that overstaying the period of admission and some similar reasons could be considered administratively as equivalent to a breach of “public order”, but the British representative doubted that in the normal course of events, a stateless person could be expelled for failure to comply with regulations. On the other hand, the German representative proposed to replace the words “public order” with “serious grounds of public order” if a more restrictive interpretation was desired. The conference finally abandoned all efforts to change anything in this respect so that the words are to be interpreted in the same sense as the Article was originally drafted (by the Refugee Conference). As regards the question of who is entitled to interpret the term, there was almost unanimous agreement that it should be left to each Contracting State. However, this cannot do away with the general obligation of the Parties to fulfil their obligations under the conference in a fair spirit or with the rights of other states resulting from the application of Article 34. 6. Paragraph 2 provides for procedural guarantees in case of permitted expulsion. One of them is the requirement of a “decision reached in accordance with due process of law”. This does not necessarily mean a court decision because the law may provide for an administrative 222 procedure. “Due process of law” means in substance only that in no case may a decision be reached except as provided for in the law in force in the given country. This is clearly expressed in the French text of the Refugee Convention which deals with a décision rendue conformément à la procédure prévue par la loi (“a decision reached in conformity with the procedure prescribed by law”). The next procedural guarantee is that the stateless person, who is accused of being a menace to national security or public order, must be given the necessary facilities to submit evidence that the accusation is unfounded, that there is an error in identity or any other evidence required to clear him of the accusation. He must furthermore be granted the right to appeal to and be represented by counsel before the authority which, under domestic law, is either called upon to hear such appeals or is the body superior to the one which has made the decision; if the decision is made by authorities from whose decision no appeal is permitted, a new hearing 223 instead of appeal must be provided. The authority in question may assign officials to hear the presentation. However, these guarantees may be obviated by “compelling reasons of national security”, for instance, when a decision must be reached in the interests of national security in such a short time as does not permit the authority to allow the stateless person the necessary time to collect evidence or to transport him to the required place; or where a hearing may be prejudicial to national security (for instance, in case of espionage). Since para. 2 speaks of “compelling” reasons, they must really be of a very serious nature and the exception to sentence one cannot be applied save very sparingly and in very unusual cases. 7. Paragraph 3 deals with the status of the stateless person after a final decision of 224 expulsion has been taken. It does not permit the state to proceed to actual expulsion at once but enjoins it to grant him sufficient time to find a place to go. Although para. 3 does not say so explicitly, it must be assumed that the stateless person must be granted the necessary facilities to 225 find admission to another country. They must be of such a nature as to make it possible for the stateless person to secure admission elsewhere because the Convention considers expulsion a measure to be taken only if the stateless person in unable to leave the country on his own motion. 8. The German representative stated correctly that an expulsion order against a stateless person could rarely be executed. However, the Convention does not provide, except implicitly, for 222 See, for instance, SR.15, pp. 8-9 of the Refugee Conference and E/AC.32/SR.40, p. 15. 223 SR.15, pp. 13 ff of the Refugee Convention. 224 It was agreed in the Refugee Conference that a refugee would not be expelled while his case was sub judice (SR.15, p. 16). 225 Art. 31 (2) of the Refugee Convention provided explicitly for such facilities.