This refers mainly to the Palestine Arab refugees and Korean refugees. (b) Because the person enjoys in the country of refuge such broad rights that a status of a “stateless person” would not add anything - Para. 2 (ii). This refers mainly to the German expellees, now living in West Germany. (c) Because the person is regarded as unworthy of international protection - Para. 2 (iii). To become unworthy of protection, the person need not be proven to have been found guilty of actually having committed any act described in Article 1; it suffices that there are serious reasons for considering that he did so. What reasons are “serious”, will obviously be decided by the authorities of the country of residence of the stateless person accused of 34 having committed or being guilty of the relevant act. It is perfectly possible that one country will regard available data as sufficient to declare a person a criminal while another will not. Thus it is not improbable that a person falling under this provision may be treated as a “stateless person” in one country and later be excluded from the benefits of the Convention in another state or vice versa. Furthermore, he may be declared a “stateless person” at a certain time and lose his status later, and vice versa, if his case is reviewed. The Convention distinguishes three reasons of unworthiness: (aa) the person is supposed to have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; (bb) he is alleged to have committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of his residence prior to the admission to that country; (cc) he is assumed to be guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Paragraph 2 is couched in categorical language (“This Convention shall not apply”). It follows that, once a determination is made that there are sufficient reasons to consider a certain person as coming under this paragraph, the country making the determination is barred from according him the status of a “stateless person”. It must be assumed that this refers not only to the status accorded under the Convention but also to rights which may be 35 granted to the “criminal” under the Final Act because of the nature of the exclusion. These provisions were copied from Article 1 of the Refugee Convention with a few minor changes (plural instead of singular, omission of the word “refugee”, substitution of the words “country of residence” for “country of refuge”). The reasons given for exclusion from the benefits of the Refugee Convention are therefore also valid here: Ad (aa). The person is assumed to have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity. At first (in the ECOSOC and General Assembly) only crimes defined in the Charter of the London International Military Tribunal were considered sufficient grounds for exclusion. However, the conference on the Refugee Convention used a broader frame of reference. One reason was that in the meantime the International Law Commission had started work on a Code of Offences which, in its final version, may deviate from the text of the London Charter; the conference rightly reasoned that this text, whenever it becomes final, should govern exclusion rather than the one which was drawn up for special purposes. The change, however, prompts the question whether, as of the present time, only the London Charter or also Control Council Law No. 10 may be regarded as an “international instrument 34 The draft of the relevant provisions of the Refugee Convention, as adopted by the Economic and Social Council, stated that it referred to persons who, in the opinion of the competent authorities of the state concerned committed the crime or act. 35 Cf. in this regard E/AC.32, SR.18, paras. 3 and 4.