Rising Statelessness Due to Disappearing Island States
Statelessness (‘The Final Act of the 1961 Convention’), which provides that
‘persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless
de jure to enable them to acquire effective nationality’. 32 Thus, it is at state
discretion to follow the recommendations made by the Final Acts to the
Conventions on Statelessness. 33
Nonetheless, Part V will show the practical importance of closing this gap in
legal protection in the example of disappearing island states. For the purposes of
this article it is, however, first necessary to explore the relevance of having a
nationality in general. Subsequently it will be argued that nationality is essential
for the effective enjoyment of human rights.
III
THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A NATIONALITY
Statelessness and nationality are necessarily interlinked, as statelessness results
from the fact that a person does not have the nationality of any state. However, not
having a nationality has many detrimental consequences. The International Court
of Justice (‘ICJ’) prominently held in its Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstien v
Guatemala) (‘Nottebohm Case’) that
nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties. 34
Accordingly, states grant a range of rights only to their nationals. 35 Most
importantly, these guarantees include political participation rights such as the right
to vote, rights to residence and free movement, consular assistance, or social
benefits such as health care, social assistance or family benefits. 36 Frequently, the
right to education and employment is also linked to the nationality of a person,
thus often driving stateless people into poverty. 37 Rights are usually limited to
nationals, as such, the right to nationality has been frequently called ‘the right to
have rights’. 38 This applies both domestically as well as internationally: without
nationality, persons will not enjoy certain fundamental rights under domestic
constitutional law; likewise the enforcement of human rights on the international
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future
Statelessness, opened for signature 4 December 1954, 989 UNTS 250 (entered into force 30
August 1961) 279 (‘Final Act of the 1961 Convention’); See also McAdam, Climate Change,
Forced Migration (n 29) 141.
See also van Waas, Nationality and Statelessness (n 15) 81: ‘it remains to be seen whether
states are willing to go beyond their present obligations and nevertheless extend international
protection’. See also Final Act of the 1954 Convention (n 29); Final Act of the 1961
Convention (n 32); 1954 Convention (n 3); 1961 Convention (n 3).
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase) (Judgment) [1955] ICJ Rep 4,
23 (‘Nottebohm Case’).
See, eg, Staatsgrundgesetz über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger 1867 [Basic Law
on the General Rights of Citizens 1867] (Austria) arts 2, 3, 6, 12; Grundgesetz für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany]
(Germany) arts 8, 9, 11, which only offer protection to citizens.
Katja Swider, ‘Why End statelessness’ in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole
(eds), Understanding Statelessness (Routlege 2017) 191, 192; Edwards (n 16) 12. See also
Kristy A Belton, ‘Statelessness and Economic and Social Rights’ in Lanse Minkler (ed), The
State of Economic and Social Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2013) 221.
Cf Katja Göcke, ‘Stateless Persons’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) vol 9, 551[3].
This phrase stems from philosopher and writer Hannah Arendt, who was stripped of her
nationality by Nazi Germany. Weissbrodt and Collins (n 8) 248.
47