“ineffective citizenship.” Relatedly, international human rights laws on statelessness fail to address this problem. In this chapter, I explore the limitations of the international legal definition of statelessness in order to illustrate two points. First, as explained later, what should be termed “effective statelessness” is a necessary adjunct to the concept of de jure statelessness. Without this conceptual pairing, we cannot judge the actual relationship between a state and those who belong to it. In the Americas, as I will show, a substantial number of persons entitled to citizenship cannot prove it, or such proof is disregarded by government officials. At the same time, these persons do not qualify for protection under international law because they are not legally “stateless.” Second, without some measure of “effective statelessness,” claims that the Americas should be viewed as a relative success story because of the jus soli norm are questionable. Jus soli prevents statelessness only where it is accompanied by meticulous and generally recognized documentation. Effective statelessness can exist in any nation, and it is a hidden problem in the Americas, jus soli notwithstanding. Effective statelessness occurs due to poor documentation of births and administrative ineptitude, as well as intentional discrimination. In the Americas, including the United States, the predominant reasons for effective statelessness include inability to prove nationality, as well as the failure of countries to document or recognize their own citizens. International law treaties on statelessness fail to provide a sufficient safety net and thus offer no meaningful remedy to the problems of ineffective citizenship addressed here and in this book more generally (see esp. Lawrance, chapter 3). 2 Electroniccopy copyavailable available at: at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3150558 Electronic https://ssrn.com/abstract=3150558