2025 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 7(1) having a Syrian legal identity continued to resist identity destruction, by maintaining and reinvigorating ‘home’ identities that ran contrary to official enforced identities.124 Strategic compliance with ID systems and subversion have played important roles in maintaining group presence of in the home country of those affected by citizenship violence. In all three cases, maintaining a population and identity in the homelands has been vital in maintaining resistance efforts against the backdrops of ethnic cleansing and genocide. In such scenarios, forced ID systems can and do cause intra-communal fissures, which was evident in the Rohingya situations where NVC holders expressed feelings of shame in interviews, and similarly evident in Bahram’s interviews with naturalised Kurds.125 Further, the provision of identity documents and pathways to different forms of citizenship under the international ‘legal identity for all’ and ‘end statelessness’ agendas are almost universally promoted as solutions. 126 The hidden nature of strategic compliance and subversion means that the nuances of these forms of citizenship violence have made few dents in the international discourses that promote universal IDing. IV CONCLUSION This article has outlined some of collective responses to citizenship stripping and citizenship violence. These ground-level modes of resistance draw attention to different state practices associated with citizenship stripping and violence. These forms of resistance can inform and influence international approaches aimed at ending statelessness. However, this requires organisations and individuals working at national and international levels in the anti-statelessness sector to look to ground-level forms of resistance and social action in seeking solutions. The real challenge within the state-centred confines of global advocacy is, how can the sector begin to address statelessness when it is a product of state violence and group persecution? There are more and more critiques of how the international ‘legal identities for all’ agenda can exacerbate problems associated with statelessness and state exclusions. 127 This is particularly the case where state violence and racism are factors. How then can the anti-statelessness sector approach situations in which support for ID systems and civil registration simultaneously provide progress for citizens, but also serve to legitimise violent states or exclusionary state practices? There are no easy answers. Neither is there a neat set of bullet points to serve as policy recommendations. This concluding Part of the article instead looks to the five modes of resistance to consider some of the implications, presenting them as a set of related challenges. This is with the hope of generating more reflection around responsive anti-statelessness interventions in situations where the state is a bad faith actor. The first mode of resistance considered refusals as a way to counter re-categorisation of people as foreigners or outsiders. These collective forms of resistance drew attention to the situations in which particular modes of registration and documentation harmed people by compounding or extending exclusions. 124 125 126 127 Bahram, Too Little Too Late (n 35). Bahram, Too Little Too Late (n 35); Bahram, Between Home and Exile (n 31). Manby (n 4). ibid; Natalie Brinham and Ali Johar, ‘Refugee Experiences of Identity Documents and Digitisation in India and Myanmar’ (2024) Forced Migration Review 8. 28