Report on Citizenship Law: Mali impeded, while large populations remain displaced from their homes or refugees in other countries, also impeding registration despite the efforts of international aid agencies and the relative success of the NINA card in refugee camps.114 Hundreds of thousands of Malians remain abroad as refugees, their lack of documentation compounded by the failure to register births in many refugee camps.115 Throughout Mali’s history, as in most countries, voting is limited to nationals.116 As well, while civil registration and issuance of the NINA card in refugee camps has been successful, it is not clear that these efforts have reached the Tuareg community. Political decentralisation and the rights of minority groups, particularly nomads, continue to dominate the question of Malian nationality. The politics of Mali present serious challenges to registration and inclusion for many Malians, particularly members of rural, nomadic and minority groups. Despite ECOWAS, border checks between West African states are common. Meanwhile, Mali’s worst conflict is along its northern border with Algeria and Libya, who are not ECOWAS members. Though less so than neighbouring Niger, Mali is now a transit country for people smuggling to Europe and increasingly, a conduit for drug smuggling. 5.2 Decentralisation in northern Mali – The Algiers Accord The current debate over the future of northern Mali revolves around the status of northern Mali, the territory claimed for the Tuareg state of ‘Azawad’. Over the past fifteen years, the government of Mali has proposed decentralisation as an answer. The question of decentralisation in northern Mali, however, raises the question of what decentralisation would look like. In particular, it raises the question of whether it might include changes to the nationality code. In 2014, Mali and certain rebel groups signed the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process, a road map for decentralisation.117 The Algiers Accord recognised the special culture and national identity of northern Mali, while also affirming the territorial integrity of Mali. The agreement envisioned the devolution of some powers to regional and local assemblies and the creation of new regions in the north. The agreement, however, does not provide for any separate authorities on the granting of nationality, the issuance of ID or the creation of an internal border between northern and southern Mali. The current agreement, therefore, does not appear as though it will impact Malian nationality law in any substantive way. In common with other post-colonial states, Mali remains a unitary country with a single, centralised nationality regime, despite the challenges of diversity and demands for decentralised political control. There is no move towards any segmented citizenship rights, 114 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Mali Situation: UNHCR Regional Update, December 2015-February 2016’, February 2016. 115 UNHCR, ‘MALI: Refugees, Internationally Displaced Persons and Returnees as of 30 November 2019’. 116 Malian electoral law (Law No. 02-007 of 12 February 2002). 117 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers Process, Bamako (20 June 2015). 20 RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-CR 2020/11- © 2020 Author(s)