2468 A. ELLERMANN language tests for spouses explicitly justified the targeting of lesser educated Muslim immigrants with reference to their supposed ‘cultural backwardness’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 8). Similarly, Dutch legislators acknowledged that pre-entry tests were designed to limit family immigration by targeting those with ‘entry problems.’ Family migrants from Turkey and Morocco in particular were seen to bear ‘characteristics that are unfavorable for good integration into Dutch society.’ Pre-entry tests thus served the ‘postponement or even cancellation of the intended settlement in the Netherlands’ (Goodman 2011, 244). Studies of the impact of pre-entry language and income requirements for family migration have demonstrated that these policy hurdles can be insurmountable, regardless of self-determination (Groenendijk 2011; Gutekunst 2015; Ellermann and Goenaga In Press). The case of civic integration policy thus not only challenges the argument that the logic of inclusion/exclusion in immigration and citizenship policy has ceased to be collectivist, but also refutes the assumption that inclusion is within the reach of all who exercise individual agency and self-determination. While most analyses of class and immigration are nested within nation-states, David Owen (this issue) moves the normative discussions of exclusion and inclusion to the global level where ‘[t]ransnational social stratification in terms of income is not primarily a function of “national class position” but of “state of residence”’ (2020, 2587). Owen points to the role of unilateral border policies in maintaining the racialized nature of global income inequality. As long as legal immigration pathways from the Global South to the Global North will remain closed off, transnational patterns of racialized exclusion will continue to be reproduced. Not long after the embrace of civic integration prompted a return to the investigation of group bias and discrimination, the study of religion – more precisely, of Islam – (re)emerged on social science research agendas. Whilst the study of religion had virtually disappeared from migration and citizenship studies (particularly in Europe), the resurgence of Islamophobia in the wake of rising Islamist terrorism prompted migration and citizenship scholars to focus their attention on the relationship between Islam and the West, largely within the context of immigration from Muslim-majority countries to Europe (Laurence 2012). These studies of Islam in immigrant-receiving societies have paid close attention ‘to the relationship between religion and power, to the ways in which religion marks the contours of inequality, and to the ways in which attributions of belonging and non-belonging are still coded through religion even within post-secular societies’ (Permose 2014). Migration and citizenship scholars have exposed the ways in which religion serves as an axis of inclusion and exclusion in societies that, even when purportedly ‘secular,’ remain shaped by Christianity (Rottmann and Ferree 2008; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009; Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, and Zolberg 2011; Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos 2013). In this issue, Catherine Dauvergne (2020) moves the discussion of the relationship between Islam and the West beyond Europe by examining the gendered ways in which immigration law has responded to two threats commonly associated with fundamentalist Islam: terrorism and forced marriage. She argues that the ‘westernized-quasi-universalism’ inherent in human rights arguments that have been relied upon in negotiating these challenges not only has failed to provide for a nuanced understanding of Islam, but also has disempowered women and exacerbated gender inequality. In a highly masculinised security context, policy makers have assumed ‘knowability’ of terrorist threats, thereby moving the issue out of reach of human rights arguments. By