persecution, on par with harassment.191 For instance, this view has long been that of the UNHCR which has advocated a ‘cumulative grounds’ approach in cases involving discriminatory measures not in themselves amounting to persecution.192 It has been argued that ‘The idea that there are degrees of severity when it comes to discrimination is unique to refugee law’.193 From the perspective of international human rights law, the principle of non-discrimination (which is enshrined in all core human rights treaties) is generally used in conjunction with another human right. With the exception of Article 26 ICCPR and Article 24 American Convention on Human Rights, it is not a self-standing provision in that it guarantees the equal recognition, enjoyment and exercise of other human rights. The key question therefore becomes whether or not discrimination is affecting the meaningful enjoyment of an individual’s rights (such as his or her rights to life, not to be tortured, to work, to education etc.). If it is, no matter what right is affected (e.g., economic, social or cultural), the discriminatory basis makes such matters also a violation of civil and political rights.194 In some cases, discrimination may also constitute a serious violation of human rights in itself, e.g., racial discrimination, based on the ‘consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned’.195 Such instances are evidence that the meaning of discrimination in human rights law can in fact be similar to that in refugee law ‘cumulatively’ or ‘in certain circumstances’. Similarities exist between the UNHCR’s ‘cumulative grounds’ or ‘circumstantial’ approach (understood as establishing an objective test and not a subjective test as sometimes suggested) and the human rights approach whereby for a violation of fundamental rights to constitute persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, it must be sufficiently serious.196 Indeed, since Ireland v UK (1978), the Court’s leitmotiv in all Article 3 cases has been its ‘obligation to consider all the relevant circumstances of the case’. Thirty years later, in the leading case NA v UK,197 the Court explained that this means that all relevant factors taken cumulatively should be considered, and that include all personal circumstances as well as the general situation in the country of destination. In this case, the Strasbourg Court accepted the argument, which had been made by UNHCR regarding the Refugee Convention that individual acts of harassment taken together might constitute persecution, and it applied it to Article 3 ECHR. The cumulative approach was confirmed in Dowd, ‘Dissecting Discrimination in Refugee Law’, at p.32. UNHCR Handbook, para.53. 193 Dowd, ‘Dissecting Discrimination in Refugee Law’, at p.35. 194 Neier, The International Human Rights Movement, p.80 referring to the judgment by the Constitutional Court of South Africa Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC), 5 July 2002. 195 UNHCR Handbook, para.54. See also application 4403/70, East African Asians v UK, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 December 1973, [1973] ECHR 2. 196 For a compelling discussion on this point, see Storey, ‘Persecution: Towards a Working Definition’. 197 NA v UK, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 17 July 2008, 4 th section. 191 192 35