with regard to nationality . The ECN repeats the provision of the Hague Convention in Article . Similarly, the Court of Justice of EU CJEU has held that “ u nder international law, it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality. 11 States provide for different modes of acquisition of nationality, which may include birth on the territory, descent, registration and naturalisation. 8. However, state discretion in nationality matters can be limited by human rights law: “The development, after the Second World War, of international norms for the protection of human rights gave the rules of international law a greater say in the area of nationality. By virtue of these norms and principles, some of the processes of internal law, such as those leading to statelessness or any type of discrimination, have become questionable at the international level. States are therefore subject to two types of limitations in the area of nationality, the first type relating to the delimitation of competence between States (whose non-compliance with the rules results in the non-enforceability against third States of the nationality thus conferred) and the second, to the obligations associated with the protection of human rights (whose non-observance entails international responsibility).”12 These Principles are addressed holistically to the latter question: they link deprivation of nationality to international state responsibility in the field of human rights law. 9. The view of many international human rights law scholars is that the terms nationality and citizenship can be used interchangeably, because “the label is less important than the ability to exercise rights".13 The Principles therefore consider these terms synonymous. 2.2. Deprivation of nationality PRINCIPLE 2.2. LEGAL STANDARD Deprivation of nationality 2.2.1. Deprivation of nationality refers to any loss, withdrawal or denial of nationality that was not voluntarily requested by the individual. This A/HRC/13/34 (2009 Report of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality), para. 23: “While the question of arbitrary deprivation of nationality does not comprise the loss of nationality voluntarily requested by the 11 CJEU, Micheletti and Others v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria (1992), Case C-369/90, para 10. ILC, First report on State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural and legal persons submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Mikulka (A/CN.4/467). 13 E.g. A. Edwards, ‘The Meaning of Nationality in International Law in an Era of Human Rights. Procedural and Substantive Aspects’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law Cambridge University Press p. : “They argue that while distinction between nationality (international law) and citizenship (municipal law) can be maintained in many contexts, it is also true that there is a close relationship between the two, such that making such a clear distinction is not always necessary or helpful. From a rights perspective, the label is less important than the ability to exercise rights. Such an approach is adopted because … ‘ n ationality has no positive immutable meaning. On the contrary its meaning and import have changed with the changing character of States … Nationality always connotes, however, membership of some kind in the society of a State or nation.’ Likewise, the substantive content of ‘citizenship’ will depend to a large extent on one’s country of citizenship. 12 22