Statelessness & Citizenship Review 2019 1(1) since both the applicant and the state authorities repeatedly and seemingly inconsistently alleged in various documents that the applicant was stateless, a national of Albania, of Kosovo and of Serbia and Montenegro. 35 However, no written statements by the Albanian authorities confirming or denying that the applicant was their national were submitted to the Court. Evidence indicating that the applicant was stateless included his birth certificate issued in Kosovo, according to which he did not have any nationality, as well as the applicant’s statement that when he attempted to contact the authorities of Albania and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (while it existed), he was orally informed that he was not a citizen of those countries. 36 On the basis of such evidence, the Court did not only declare the applicant to be stateless, 37 but found it ‘striking’ 38 that Croatia did not come to the same conclusion and did not comply with its statelessness-related international obligations. The ECtHR insisted that the statelessness of the applicant was ‘apparent’, and that there was no ground to believe he was either an Albanian or a Kosovar national. 39 The Court found ‘no reasons to doubt the applicant’s arguments that he was advised by the Albanian authorities that he was not an Albanian national’, 40 even though there was no written evidence or witness statements confirming that any contact between the applicant and Albanian authorities on this matter took place. The practice of ‘doubting’ stateless persons’ accounts of their futile attempts to contact various embassies is fairly standard in Europe and the ECHR offers in this case a legal basis for a potential drastic change of discourse. Thus, the Court clearly indicates that if statelessness is a relevant factor in accessing ECHR rights, a state cannot place all the burden of proof on the individual in determining his or her statelessness, or set too high a standard of proof. C Right to Citizenship and Right to Stability of Residence The Hoti case, according to the ECtHR, is not about whether the applicant should be granted Croatian citizenship but rather whether, if he had chosen not to become Croatian citizen or had failed to do so, he would have an effective possibility to regularize his residence status allowing him to normally lead his private life in Croatia. 41 This distinguishes Hoti from Genovese v Malta, 42 as in the latter decision the issue at stake was nationality as part of the concept of private life. Moreover, the reference to the choice of not becoming a citizen in the quote above is noteworthy. As mentioned in Part II above, in 1989 the applicant was encouraged to apply for the citizenship of SFRY, but refused to do so, citing the lack of benefits he saw in 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 ibid [21], [26], [29], [38]–[40], [48], [52], [54]–[55]. However, see also Part III(D), on ‘the use of terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ in the judgment. ibid [37]–[38], [57], [110]. ibid section III, [109]–[110]. ibid [138]. ibid. ibid [110]. Hoti (n 1) [131]. (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 53124/09, 11 January 2012). See also Rene de Groota and Olivier Vonk, ‘Nationality, Statelessness and ECHR’s Article 8: Comments on Genovese v Malta’ (2012) 14(3) European Journal of Migration and Law 317. 188