102 | Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Dominican Republic 236. The Commission observes in this regard that in the case sub examine the applicable provision in Constitutional Court judgment TC/0168/13 can be traced to the Dominican Constitution that dates back to June 20, 1929, up until the 2010 Constitution, under which Dominican nationality was conferred upon all persons born within Dominican national territory, based on the principle of jus soli, the only exception being the legitimate children of foreigners residing in the country in diplomatic representation or those in transit through it, regardless of the parents’ migratory situation. However, despite having been born on Dominican soil, Mrs. Juliana Deguis was denied this right. 237. In the Commission’s view, with the new interpretation established by the Constitutional Court in judgment TC/0168/13, the measures and policies that other Dominican authorities had been promoting for years were assimilated into the law, a situation complicated by the fact that the court’s interpretation would be applied retroactively, to all persons born on Dominican soil to parents with an irregular migratory situation and as far back as June 21, 1929. Judgment TC/0168/13 brought with it a general measure that arbitrarily deprived a considerable number of persons of their Dominican nationality and left stateless all those who had no legal claim to citizenship in any other State. The persons affected by this judgment were already unable to fully enjoy other human rights, a situation only made worse by this arbitrary deprivation of nationality and the stateless condition in which it left many people. 238. Judgment TC/0168/13, also deprived of legal certainty in the enjoyment of their right to nationality to all those Dominicans who possessed national official documentation as proof of it. This was due to the fact that their birth certificates or the entries for their births in the Civil Registry books were being audited by the Central Electoral Board to determine whether any of these persons were irregularly registered. These measures violate the right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to a name and, when these violations are combined, the right to identity. 239. Furthermore, when examining the meaning that the Constitutional Court attributes to the expression “foreigners in transit”, the Commission will refer to Section V of the Dominican Republic’s Immigration Regulation No. 279 of May 12, 1939, which was in force at the time Mrs. Deguis Pierre’s birth was registered. The 1939 provision was clear in stating that “[f]oreign nationals seeking to enter the Republic primarily for the purpose of traveling through the country in route to another foreign destination shall be accorded the privileges accorded to transient persons.” This provision of the law goes on to state that “[a] period of 10 days shall ordinarily be deemed sufficient time to be able to transit through the Republic.” 241 240. Here, the Commission is reminded of what the Inter-American Court wrote in reference to the Dominican Republic, where it held that to consider that a person is in transit, irrespective of the classification used, the State must respect a reasonable temporal limit and understand that a foreigner who develops connections in a State 241 Immigration Regulation No. 279 of May 12, 1939, provision V. Organization of American States | OAS