THE ROUND TABLE 151 involvement, forced movement continued as approximately 200,000 Rohingya were returned to the Rakhine State by the end of 1996 (Yegar, 2002). Heeding Lessons from Past Failures While myriad factors contributed to the 1990’s failed repatriation, the Rohingya’s statelessness was detrimental to any short- or long-term solution. Viewed as illegal occupants, any effort at repatriation was unlikely to be voluntary or lasting and can even be considered in direct violation of international protections of refugees. Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention on Refugees asserts the responsibilities of states regarding the principle of non-refoulement, that: No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (UNHCR, 1951). Persecution of the Rohingya in the Rakhine State prior to and during the repatriation clearly depicts a situation of both fear for life and freedom – a situation which should have undoubtedly entitled Rohingya’s protection against refoulement. While the group’s status as stateless is not the sole reason for refoulement, the very essence of statelessness contributed to the lack of protection while in exile, increased the probability of an involuntary repatriation process, and all but guaranteed continued abuse upon return. In short, the Rohingya’s status as stateless was a primary mechanism for ill-treatment before, during, and post-exile. In addition, the lack of citizenship in Myanmar is a primary reason the Rohingya were targeted in the clearance operations of 1991. As suggested, the successful and lasting repatriation of Rohingya has been nearly impossible due to their continued status as illegal immigrants. This argument is more probable when one considers that then president of the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, Dr Mohammad Yunus, speaking about repatriation in the 1990s, demanded specific assurances from the Burmese government including citizenship for the Rohingya before the population would commit to voluntary repatriation. In 1992, Yunus explained that ‘In 1974 and in 1978 our people [the Rohingya] went back under a similar situation with United Nations help, but our fate did not change, and I am pessimistic about the chances of success for the world body’ (Qadir, 1992). Further, the fact the Myanmar agreed to the repatriation terms with Bangladesh, and later with the UNHCR, is noteworthy. Pressure from regional players (Malaysia and Pakistan), international pressure from the US and UN, and diplomatic attempts to improve relations with Bangladesh to avoid a looming border war each contributed to Myanmar’s willingness to move forward with repatriation. However, it became increasingly clear that Myanmar would take a hard line against the Rohingya, going as far as to deny the scale of the problem, as evidenced by the Ministry or Foreign Affairs press release in late February 1992: ‘no matter how much the unscrupulous elements in the country and abroad try to deceive, fabricate and magnify the [Rohingya refugee] problem which actually has its roots in the immigration procedures, their endeavours will surely come to nought’ (BBC, 1992). Thus, while the government agreed to allow