THE ROUND TABLE 147 (Stein and Cuny, 1994). In cases of the former, refugees may have little desire to return, particularly if they have found a favourable environment in their country of asylum (Kibreab, 2003). Others suggest that the success or failure of a repatriation may be dependent upon the reception of local residents or ‘stayees’, who may view returners as a burden (Kibreab, 2002, p. 77). Here, refugees’ arrival can increase competition for scarce resources, which may be exacerbated in poor countries (Hammond, 1999, p. 228). In addition, the lack of third-party involvement, or the over-involvement of international organisations as seen in the case of the return of Sri Lankan refugees from India in the early 1990s, have also been notable contributors to repatriation failures (Kendle, 1998). An additional explanation for repatriation failure is the lack of state accountability. While the UN Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation outlines responsibilities of both host and country of origin, responsibilities of the host country are essential. For refugees, a government’s failure to adhere to ‘the fundamental principle of non-refoulement not to return refugees in any manner whatsoever . . . where their life or freedom would be threatened’ can negatively affect a population (UNHCR, 1996).4 In these cases, the involuntary nature of repatriation has been identified as the equivalent to ‘acquiescing to ethnic cleansing’ (Bradley, 2014, p. 122). Still, while countries of asylum are critical to repatriation efforts, the country of origin also bears responsibility. According to the UN handbook, ‘where refugees have lost their nationality, the country of origin should arrange for its restoration’ (UNHCR, 1996). In addition, the handbook mandates that the country of origin ensure that the group gain full national protection, end any discrimination, provide repatriating refugees with documentation, and seek lasting solutions to the refugee problems (UNHCR, 1996). Thus, a repatriation’s success can largely be dependent upon the behaviour of both host and country of origin. Until recently, however, scant attention has been given to the repatriation of stateless refugees. Most scholarship has focused exclusively on those populations which fit the traditional definition of a refugee – a person fleeing a country because of armed conflict, violence or persecution in search of sanctuary – but has failed to examine cases where refugees were not citizens of the state(s) they fled.5 This oversight is problematic as Adelman and Barkan (2011) noted that the right to return to one’s country hinged on a person’s designation as a citizen of that country. For refugees who can ‘lay claim to a place in a state’s political community’, stateless persons ‘must carve out a fresh space . . . as a recognized member of a state’s political community’ (Bradley, 2013, p. 10). Consequently, stateless refugees are often left with little recourse once they have fled. For the repatriation process, stateless refugees are left with a quandary: remain in a country of asylum and hope for protection/integration or return, often with little guarantee of any meaningful change to the status quo. Evidence has shown that refugees can, at times, lose all agency in the decision-making process. In Tanzania, for instance, over 100 Burundian refugees accused of armed activity were captured by the Tanzanian Army and forcibly repatriated in 1997 only to be shot upon return (Toft, 2007, p. 140). Whether voluntary or coerced, the repatriation of stateless refugees is an immensely challenging process at best and, at worst, an improbable task if undertaken without addressing the foundational issue of statelessness. We contend that the very