Theoretical error, real-world problems 35 importance­of­justifying­(i.e­not­just­assuming)­restriction­of­rights­to­citizens.27 For­him,­(human)­rights­just­are­‘conditions­that­the­institutions­of­all­domestic­ societies should strive to satisfy, whatever a society’s more comprehensive aims’.28 On the one hand, this seems to admit a noncitizenism like that presented in this book. On the other hand, in his 2009 book The Idea of Human Rights, Beitz­explains­that­institutional­protection­for­rights­is­to­be­provided­in­the­first­ instance­ by­ States,­ through­ their­ laws­ and­ policies,­ where­ ‘the­ beneficiaries­ of­ these protections are citizens’.29 It is possible that he did not intend this to restrict scope only to formal citizens. Yet, this reintroduction of the assumption of cit izenship, even if only through a quirk of language, is not uncommon amongst cosmopolitan approaches. Beitz and other cosmopolitans who do this do not explain how the composition of that citizenry is to be decided, how someone may enter it, nor how noncitizens are to feature. Rights theorists, including those who concern themselves directly with the problems of dehumanisation and exclusion, can also be found to use language in this way.30 Methodological citizenism Amongst­ theorists­ of­ global­ justice,­ then,­ there­ is­ another­ common­ problem.­ While concerned with noncitizens overseas, some appear to take it for granted when­they­discuss­justice­within a State that they are talking only of citizens.31 Jon­Mandle,­for­example,­explicitly­discusses­noncitizens­abroad,­including­with­ regard to political participation.32 He describes a hypothetical mechanism for allowing neighbouring or allied countries or other foreign groups to have input when­ a­ proposed­ law­ would­ significantly­ affect­ them,­ but­ concludes­ that­ ‘it­ is­ not­unjust­for­a­constitution­to­exclude­them’.33­He­sums­this­up:­‘[i]n­one­case,­ the­individual­is­a­member­of­the­collective­body­in­whose­name­the­injustice­is­ being­perpetrated,­while­in­the­other­case­he­is­not­complicit­in­the­injustice.’34 ­ In­ a­ different­ way,­ Gillian­ Brock’s­ 2009­ book­ on­ global­ justice­ explicitly­ addresses immigration, and some of the needs and rights arising as a result.35 But 27 Charles Beitz (1975) ‘Justice and International Relations’, pp. 360–389 in Philosophy and Public Affairs 4; Charles Beitz (1979) Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton Univer sity Press (1999 edition). 28­ Charles­Beitz­(2003)­‘What­Human­Rights­Mean’­pp.­36–46­in­Daedalus 132(1), p. 44. 29 Charles Beitz (2009) The Idea of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, p. 85. 30 For example, Ronald Dworkin discusses the particular rights and obligations of citizens at length, but does not address the question of who can be a citizen and what to think about noncitizens. Ronald Dworkin (1991) Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, pp. 185, 266. 31 Seyla Benhabib provides a particularly interesting presentation of this kind of approach in terms of what she calls ‘sovereigntism’, see Chapter 7 in Seyla Benhabib (2011) Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times, Polity. 32­ Jon­Mandle­(2006)­Global Justice, Polity Press, p. 86. 33­ Mandle­2006­ibid.­p.­87. 34­ Mandle­2006­ibid.­p.­87. 35­ Gillian­Brock­(2009)­Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account, Oxford University Press.