6 ODI Policy brief The consequences of non-recognition External (non-)recognition by international states has very real implications at the international and domestic levels for de facto states, to which their authorities, governments and inhabitants respond in a variety of ways. This section explores some of the empirical consequences of non-recognition – both for the governance of de facto states, and for the everyday lives of people living in them. It breaks these down into three broad categories – political, economic and social – and addresses both the international and local dimensions of each of these categories. Political The single feature which unites all de facto states is the absence of universal recognition. However, the way in which this non-recognition manifests in practice varies hugely. For some, such as Kosovo (recognised by around 100 states (Buchholz, 2023)) or Taiwan (recognised by 13 (Curtis, 2023)), being ‘de facto’ may not come at the expense of extensive integration into the global economy and participation in international political processes. Palestine, meanwhile, has obtained only observer status at the UN, despite recognition by 139 states (Palestine UN, n.d.). Others, such as Abkhazia and Northern Cyprus, have extremely limited foreign relations, and are dominated by their close relations with their patron states (Russia and Turkey, respectively) and antagonism with their parent states (Georgia and Greece). However, even in the absence of international recognition, de facto states can pursue active foreign policies and international development assistance can still flow into de facto states in significant volumes. Taiwan has a substantial network of ‘de facto’ embassies (Taiwan ROC, n.d.), while Abkhazia, Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan (the latter of which, it should be noted, is not actively pursuing independence from the Iraqi state) all maintain quasi-diplomatic offices in a number of states (Hoch and Rudincova, 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, n.d.; KRGa, n.d.). Numerous countries have established consulates in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the UK has an office in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, as do a handful of other states including Ethiopia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (FCDO, 2023; Embassy Pages, n.d.; KRGb, n.d.). Despite being recognised by no other state, Somaliland also receives significant international aid, primarily through INGOs and multilateral agencies. However, as the UN does not recognise Somaliland as separate from Somalia, often referring instead to the “18 pre-war regions of Somalia” in official publications, measuring the value of aid spent in Somaliland is challenging, leading Somaliland government representatives to complain of the ‘uphill struggle’ of tracking UN and INGO spending in Somaliland (Philips, 2020). The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia deals jointly with Federal Government of Somalia-controlled Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland, drawing into question the degree to which the international intervention is structured to address the vastly different political circumstances in each of these territories (UN OCHA, 2023).