The Shifting Parameters of Nationality 285 where these international human rights are not respected and cannot effectively be enforced, diplomatic protection provides a possible safety net.116 Particularly important, since it also constitutes the bridge to rights and entitlements within the state, is the states duty to allow their nationals entry in the state territory.117 As the preceding historical account (on state formation) highlighted, from the moment states had clearly defined borders, and sovereign powers within these borders, questions of border control and immigration control became closely intertwined with states’ quest to secure their sovereignty.118 The right to enter a state, and the protection against being expelled, implies a right to stay, and thus a right to reside. This right to stay and the ‘lawful residence’ that goes along with it, was traditionally also a prerequisite for the enjoyment of social rights (rights to work, social services, health care, education, and social security).119 Active and passive voting rights are also traditionally limited to citizens, to persons with the nationality of the state concerned.120 This is clearly reflected in the framing of Article 25 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which restricts the scope of application of voting rights and even of the right ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs’ more generally to ‘every citizen’, as opposed to ‘everyone’. 4.2.2 Rights are Increasingly Detached from ‘Nationality’ It is widely recognized that the developing human rights paradigm increasingly constrains state sovereignty. Particularly important in relation to a special issue on nationality is the fact that human rights are rights one has simply because one is a human being, irrespective of characteristics and generally also irrespective of legal status.121 The equality principle is thus ingrained in the concept of human rights itself, as it is in relation to rights of citizens.122 The growing list of positive obligations on states to ensure the effective protection of fundamental rights, could be argued to point to some level of obligation on states to protect their nationals when they suffer severe human rights violations at the hand of third states, such as in the case of the violation of peremptory norms.123 Notwithstanding the growing support that is noted for the recognition of some duty to afford 116 As Vermeer-Künzli (2007) underscores: in the end diplomatic protection is about the optimal protection of individuals against violations of international human rights, p. 37. 117 Rubenstein and Adler (2000), p. 525. See also Kesby (2012), p. 60. 118 See also Kesby (2012), p. 101. 119 An appendix to the European Social Charter both in its original and revised version expressly restricts the personal scope of application of most Charter rights to foreigners who reside and/or work legally on the territory of the state concerned. For an extensive discussion see O’Cinneide (2014), pp. 288–289. See also Art. 8 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (195) A/RES/40/144. 120 See also Cole (2003), p. 370. 121 See also Habermas (2000) who claims that the international human rights system is an emerging form of citizenship beyond the state. 122 See also Rubenstein and Adler (2000) who see citizenship as the expansion of equality among citizens. 123 Dugard (2013), p. 8. 123