From a Traditional International Law Approach to a Human Rights-Based Approach to Statelessness 4. Conclusion Under traditional international law, statelessness was understood as a technical, legal issue. The problematic nature of statelessness was understood early on, since a nationality was considered as the only link between the individual and the law of nations. In absence of that link, individuals would not be able to enjoy the benefits provided by the law of nations. Statelessness was perceived as an anomaly in international law, which could only arise due to a lack of harmonisation and coordination between States’ nationality laws. It was considered as an inevitable consequence of States’ discretionary power to decide who are their nationals and who are not. As such, three main, technical causes of statelessness were identified by writers throughout the 20th century: conflicts of laws, deprivation of nationality, and State succession. While it took a long time until an international response to statelessness was taken, the conventions that were ultimately adopted were tailored to the understanding of statelessness at the time. The 1961 Convention addressed those three technical causes of statelessness, albeit State succession was only dealt with in a very limited fashion. The 1954 Convention, on the other hand, provided a minimum protection status to stateless persons. The emergence of international human rights law fundamentally changed the understanding of and the approach to statelessness, and demonstrated the underlying human rights causes of statelessness that were overlooked by traditional international lawyers. Discrimination on varying grounds, including race and gender, arbitrary nationality deprivation, and deficient civil registration systems were acknowledged as the prime drivers of statelessness globally. More attention was gradually awarded to statelessness by the international community from the 1990s onwards, and responses to it were increasingly human rights-based. The UN human rights treaties set out various provisions related to the right to a nationality and the principle of non-discrimination, which complemented the standards of the Statelessness Conventions. As a result, statelessness was increasingly addressed through these provisions. The HRC reiterated in its resolutions the fundamental nature of the right to a nationality and the principle of non-discrimination, and acknowledged the importance of avoidance of statelessness. Thus far, statelessness has been tackled as a core human rights issue through various human rights mechanisms. This evolution towards a human rights-based approach is laudable. While the regulation of nationality under international law has always been a balancing exercise between the interests of the State on the one hand, and the rights of the individual on the other, the negative consequences for the stateless individual clearly outweigh the State’s interests in this matter, and the response to it should be tailored to the protection needs of the individual. While the human rights-based approach presents a number of clear advantages, both in terms of global support and flexibility, persistent challenges remain. While the root causes of statelessness are better understood today than in the middle of the 20th century, identification of stateless persons and populations, and the underlying causes of particular statelessness situations, remains very poor. UNHCR has a mandate to identify stateless persons, but has not properly implemented it thus far. Another challenge lies in the current international legal framework on statelessness, which is a patchwork of varying norms, originating both from the Statelessness Conventions and human rights treaties. The human rights-based approach continues to build on the outdated, technical provisions of the Statelessness Conventions, which failed to properly grasp the complexity of statelessness at that time. Moreover, the right and Deprivation of Nationality under Articles 5-9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness’ (May 2020) UN Doc HCR/GS/20/05, para. 95. European University Institute 17