Clara Van Thillo patchwork of legal rules, which further builds on the insufficient understanding of statelessness in the middle of the 20th century. As a result, the human rights-based approach at times runs into the limits of what it can offer. The prime illustration of that is the definition of a stateless person, as enshrined in Article 1 of the 1954 Convention. Batchelor observed that “a problem arises, however, in that the definition itself precludes full realisation of an effective nationality because it is a technical, legal definition which can address only technical, legal problems.”142 Many persons who formally have a nationality, are not afforded its protection. In 1951, the ILC already stressed the importance of an effective nationality.143 Nevertheless, as a result of the decisions of the drafters in 1954, persons with an ineffective nationality fall outside the scope of protection provided on the basis of the right to a nationality. If they also do not qualify for protection as refugees, they slip through the cracks of the different protection regimes.144 Finally, the right to a nationality as it is currently developed and interpreted leaves some protection gaps. Regarding the right to acquire a nationality, the first gap relates to the absence of a specific duty bearer, as it is often not clear which State has the duty to grant its nationality to an individual.145 Regarding the acquisition of nationality at birth, various (regional) instruments set out more specific rules as to which State should grant its nationality to the child.146 However, Forlati rightly points out that almost half of the States are not party to any of these instruments.147 The protection level becomes even more dire regarding the acquisition of nationality throughout the individual’s life, i.e. naturalisation. No international obligation to grant a nationality by means of naturalisation currently exists in human rights law, so States enjoy a wide margin of discretion.148 The only limits to States’ discretion include the prohibition of discrimination and arbitrariness.149 Regarding nationality deprivation, specific instances still exist in which nationality deprivation resulting in statelessness is deemed lawful. While some scholars have argued that nationality deprivation resulting in statelessness is by definition arbitrary,150 both the HRC and UNHCR maintain that it is lawful in limited circumstances, as long as it serves a legitimate aim and is proportionate.151 In sum, these protection gaps show that the right to a nationality is not full-fledged yet under the current human rights law principles. 142 Batchelor (n 70), 232. ILC ‘Report on Nationality, Including Statelessness by Mr. Manly O. Hudson, Special Rapporteur’ (1952) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1952, Vol. 2, 20. 144 The definition of a refugee, which serves as the ground for protection under international refugee law, is included in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137, art. 1. 145 ILC ‘Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States, with commentaries’ (1999) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1999, Vol. 2, Part 2, art. 1, commentary (2). 146 1961 Convention, arts. 1(1) and 4(1); ACHR, art. 20(2); ACRWC, art. 6(4); European Convention on Nationality (adopted 7 November 1997, entered into force 1 March 2000), ETS 166, art. 6(2). 147 Forlati (n 135), 21. 148 ibid, 23. 149 ibid. 150 See e.g. James A Goldston, ‘Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens’ (2006) 20 Ethics & International Affairs 321, 333. Nevertheless, van Waas and Brandvoll maintain that there is insufficient evidence that such a rule exists. Jorunn Brandvoll ‘Deprivation of nationality: Limitations on rendering persons stateless under international law’ in Alice Edwards and Laura van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014), 197-198; van Waas (n 69), 95, footnote 10. 151 HRC ‘Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the Secretary-General’ (19 December 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/25/28, para. 4; UNHCR ‘Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5: Loss 143 16 Academy of European Law