Myanmar’s Weaponization of COVID-19 ernment spokespeople have consistently de- and security of rural communities in particu- fended the internet blackout there, pointing lar remains out of reach and the response time to letters, phone calls, and even telegrams as of human rights defenders, journalists and aid sufficient communication channels with the providers is significantly slowed, costing civilian public during a time of crisis. Yet without ac- lives. cess to internet, information critical to safety Compliance as a Cost of Business Mobile services provider Telenor said in a press release that it “initially did not comply” with the MoTC order to block the requested websites, as military-backed service providers Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and Mytel had. Yet within days, and likely under significant government pressure, the telecommunications giant had “assessed the risk in not following the directive” and decided that allowing access to alleged “fake news” was “likely to have wider implications in terms of servicing the public.” By 31 March, Telenor announced it would block all 230 sites requested by the MoTC from its networks.29 It is not the first time the company – in which the Norwegian state is a major shareholder – has been confronted with the “reputational and ethical risks” of conducting business in Myanmar. In 2018, a Rohingya news organization revealed eyewitness accounts of how one of Telenor’s telecommunications towers in Alethankyaw, in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw Township, was used as a military sniper point from which to shoot fleeing Rohingya civilians in August 2017.30 It is also the site of an alleged mass grave. Telenor officials said they were concerned by the allegations and had “initiat[ed] dialogue” with the authorities to learn what happened in Alethankyaw.31 Myanmar has since been brought before the ICJ by The Gambia for breaching the Genocide Convention, for its grave human rights violations committed against the Rohingya during the period in question. Maungdaw is among the nine townships to which the MoTC has blocked internet access since June 2019. When this order to shut off mobile data was issued, Telenor complied, while also putting forward “arguments to ensure proportionality and limitations to the time and scope of the shutdown” as part of its “continued dialogue” with the government.32 After 10 months, the blockade on internet services was lifted in Maungdaw, but it remains intact in the eight other townships where it was instated. 29 Telenor Myanmar. “Blocking of 230 websites in Myanmar based on directive from the authorities.” 30 March 2020. Available at: https://www.telenor.com.mm/en/article/blocking-230-websites-myanmar-based-directive-authorities 30 Kaladan Press Network. “The Killing Fields of Alethankyaw.” 22 November 2018. Available at: https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/11/22/the-killing-fields-of-alethankyaw/ 31 Frontier Myanmar. “Telenor seeks answers over Rakhine telecom tower snipers report.” 30 November 2018. Availablet at: https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/telenor-seeks-answers-over-rakhine-telecom-tower-snipers-report 32 Telenor Myanmar. “Network Shutdown in Myanmar: 21 June 2019.” 21 June 2019. Available at: https://www.telenor. com/network-shutdown-in-myanmar-21-june-2019/?fbclid=IwAR2b3I5kL5yr_Vt0Nharlb2teGqJ9A_Daadx8VphL8CNeBIJwVG0KD5XFIo 11