38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 290 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1/16/2021 12:59 PM [Vol. 38:2 letter of the law. 332 Scholars argue that de facto statelessness is legally ambiguous, and so a more robust interpretation of the definition in the treaty would protect more people. 333 But this approach remains inadequate because it still does not take away the ideographic character of the definition, as well as the ideologies entrenched in statelessness determinations, which is embedded in the definition, and merely urges States to be more diligent in determining stateless status. 334 To reiterate, this interpretation-oriented approach accepts as a given, and thus promotes, the conflation of citizen rights with the whole braid of human rights. 335 Importantly, following this approach, State adjudicators have expressed reservations about departing too much from the letter of the law in applying the strictly legal definition. 336 The second protection-oriented movement is found in the varying but interrelated positions arguing for the broadening of the concept of statelessness to include de facto statelessness. Some scholars regard the incorporation of aspects of de facto statelessness as an opening to include individuals who might have a legal claim to the benefits of nationality, but do not enjoy the protection of nationality for a variety of reasons. 337 Yet reforming the accepted international definition to include dimensions of de facto statelessness may still be inadequate due to the capacious and ambiguous underpinnings of de facto statelessness. 338 A vague denotation will be replaced with a more opaque one. Moreover, States explicitly decided not to commit to binding obligations that relate to de facto statelessness 332. 333. See UNHCR, Expert Meeting, supra note 100. See Laura van Waas, The UN Statelessness Conventions, in NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 79–81 (Alice Edwards & Laura van Waas eds., 2014). See also Hugh Massey, UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness, LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES 61 (2010) (proposing a definition of 'de facto stateless persons' as follows: "De facto stateless persons are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. Persons who have more than one nationality are de facto stateless only if they are outside all the countries of their nationality and are unable, or for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of any of those countries."). 334. See supra Part I.C.3. 335. But see de Chickera & van Waas, supra note 40, at 60 (noting that UNHCR's approach has "broadened [collective] understanding of statelessness and . . . shown that many people previously envisaged to be de facto stateless are actually stateless, or at risk of statelessness."). 336. See Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2015) U.K.S.C. 19, United Kingdom: Supreme Court, ¶ 25 (Mar. 25). ("If this wording was intended to imply that there is something in the word 'operation' which justifies departure from the letter of the law, it is not to my mind an accurate reflection of the passage in the UNHCR text. That passage . . . is suggesting, not that the law of the country is irrelevant, but rather that, having regard to the purpose of the article, the term 'law' should be interpreted broadly as encompassing other forms of quasi-legal process, such as ministerial decrees and 'customary practice.'"). 337. See Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 29, at 251–53. 338. For a study on the different notions and contradictory meanings of de facto statelessness, see Massey, supra note 333.