Julio César Guanche political representation: “The President of the Republic, the general in chief and the members of the House shall be accused, when there is cause, before the House of Representatives. This accusation can be done by any citizen” (Art. 8). Secondly, it conceived it as an egalitarian ideal: “All inhabitants of the Republic are entirely free” (art. 4.) —which entailed the abolition of slavery—; “the Republic recognises no special dignities, honours nor privileges (art. 26) and “the citizens of the Republic will not be able to admit honours or distinctions in a foreign country (Art. 27). Thirdly, it protected citizenship as the site of sovereignty against the government: “Public contributions and loans, the ratification of treaties, the declaration and conclusion of war, the authorisation of the President to grant letters of marque, the raising and maintaining of troops, the provision and maintenance of the army, and retaliation statements towards enemy must be the object of law” (Art. 14). Fourthly, it was committed to revolutionary republican cosmopolitism6 (in the debated that approved it): “all Americans [Latin Americans] that [desire] to acquire our (Cuban) citizenship are equated to the inhabitants of the island of Cuba”. It established proportional representation, suffrage and the separation of powers as the institutional axis of the political system. The constitution of Baraguá (1878) reiterated the primary demand of a self-governed political community: “The [independentist Provincial Government] will not be able to make peace with the Spanish government on other bases without the knowledge and consent of the people” (Art. 4). The constitution of Jimaguayú (1895), repeated, for the war, the exigence of active citizenship contained in Guáimaro: “All Cubans are obliged to serve the revolution with their persons and interest, according to their aptitudes”. It also constitutionalised the issue of property as part of the democratic republican agenda: “The estates and properties of any type belonging to foreigners will be subjected to the payment of a tax in favour of the revolution among those whose respective governments do not recognise belligerence with Cuba” (Art. 20). At the same time, it established for itself a validity of two years if the war did not finish earlier, associating what today we know as legality and legitimacy. After that period, an assembly of representatives could be convened, which could modify it, elect a new governing Council and censor the outgoing one. The constitution of La Yaya (1897), fulfilling that mandate, and imagining, the close end of the war, legislated more thoroughly on the Cuban “nationality/citizenship” of those who were to be considered Cuban: those born on Cuban territory, the children of a Cuban father or mother, even if they were born abroad and those who were directly serving in the revolution whatever their nationality of origin (art. 3).7 At the same time, it reissued the approaches of its predecessors treating citizenship as an egalitarian practice and civic duty: “all citizens are obliged to serve their country with their person and belongings, according to the law and to what is allowed by their attitude” and “military service is compulsory and irrepressible”. Article 10 made a spectacular declaration at the time: “Electoral law will be regulated by the government on the basis of universal suffrage”. In the same democratic republican sense, it considered the public regulation of property and resources necessary to sustain the material base of citizenship. In its context, this meant: the (insurgent) Republic of Cuba only guaranteed the debts recognised by the constitution of 1895, and those legitimately 6 On the cosmopolitan content of revolutionary republicanism, see: (Doménech 2004). Citizenship and nationality are treated as interchangeable terms in the Constitution of La Yaya, as well as in the whole Cuban constitutional tradition until 1992. For example, the Code of Private International Law (Bustamante Code), of 1928, regulated in its articles 8 and 9: “It does not approve those principles that modify the system of ‘jus soli’ as a means of acquiring nationality” and “It does not admit precepts that resolve conflicts relating to ‘double nationality’ without prejudice to the exclusive application of ‘jus soli’. “The 1976 Constitution expressly regulated citizenship, but on one occasion used the term nationality as a synonym of citizenship (Article 29, ch.). Since the constitutional reform of 1992 only “citizenship” is used for this issue. 7 RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-CR 2020/3 - © 2020 Author(s) 5