Liberal Citizenship Is Duty-Free 201 begin with. Citizens and others have every reason to be suspicious of a notionally technocratic but still humanly fallible European Commission that is only indirectly, if at all, liable to democratic constraints. Karl Marx would be posthumously redeemed if ‘citizenship’ were available to feed ‘affectual and normative loyalty’ to that elite. There is a third problematic presumption in Ferrera’s proposal to ‘add stuff’ and to ‘dutify’ EU citizenship, which is the idea that ‘moving’ – incidentally, by a tiny group that does not even cross the five per cent mark of the EU population – causes harm that ‘stayers’ should be indemnified for. As Ferrera writes, EU citizenship ‘has empowered … mobile citizens, at the (perceived) expenses of large majorities of nonmobile citizens’. Ferrera cautiously talks about ‘perception’ here but then gives credence to it by proposing to compensate for the ‘negative externalities’ of free movers and to ‘empower’ the stayers. This would give legal dignity to the ur-trope of European populists, that of migrants as perpetrators and of natives are victims. More fundamentally still, it buys into the populists’ hideous re-­labelling of mobile EU citizens as ‘immigrants’. It is a fact that the fiscal effects of post-Enlargement migration into the UK, mainly from Poland, which has been the single-biggest theme of the Brexit campaign, have been positive. But then it would reward the British state twice over if taxpayers of other EU states were to pick up the bill of the region-specific infrastructural impasses (schooling, health care, transport, etc.) that are inevitably caused by this migration. In short, any scheme that gives legal dignity to slicing the European citizenry into two unequal halves, movers and stayers, with the perverse and absolutely anti-European connotation of moving as harmful and staying as virtuous (at least, as something to be rewarded for), is dangerous, because it confirms the demonology of European populists. This is not to deny that the binary of moving v. staying maps closely into that of openness v. closure, which is the central new cleavage of societies undergoing globalisation, being layered over the classic left-right cleavage that has structured Western politics for over 200 years. However, if the old cleavage was reconciled by the welfare state and its social citizenship, doubts are allowed that these compromise structures can be simply applied to a new situation in which globally mobile capital has greatly diminished the fiscal capacity of the state and its judicial authority over the economy. The European citizenship, in contrast to traditional citizenship that eulogises the value of staying and closure, has moving and openness written on its forehead. No compensatory EU funds for stayers or tangible benefits for tourists, patients, students, consumers, via a ‘EU Social Card’, etc., as proposed with alacrity and a great sense of practicality by Ferrera, will ever warm up the stayers to