the benefits of the other; in such a case it was a moot point whether article 7 or article 8 was to be applied. Another hypothetical case was that of a child who was protected at birth by the State whose national he was but who could find himself deprived of that protection at the age of ten and regain it at the age of eighteen. How could the provisions of articles 1 and 4 be applied to him? In view of that multiplicity of difficulties, he feared that, although the circumstances of persons who were stateless de facto were a matter of greatest concern, the terms of the proposed resolution were inappropriate in relation to the Convention.90 Following the abovementioned intervention by Paul Weis on behalf of UNHCR, the United Kingdom delegate nevertheless said at the Conference’s next meeting: recalling the doubts he had expressed at the preceding meeting concerning the appropriateness of the terms of the draft resolution, [he] nevertheless emphasized the United Kingdom’s sympathy for those unfortunate persons who were without an effective nationality. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, on the understanding that it constituted a general exhortation to States to do what they could to assist de facto stateless persons.91 As far as the acquisition of an effective nationality is concerned, applying the Resolution of the Final Act would broadly speaking require that: • • A Contracting State should grant nationality at birth, or subsequently by application within a specified period of time, to a child born in its territory who by jus sanguinis has acquired the ineffective nationality of another State;92 A Contracting State should grant nationality at birth, or subsequently by application within a specified period of time, to a child not born in the territory of a Contracting State, who has acquired by jus sanguinis or jus soli the ineffective nationality of another State, assuming that one of the parents of the child is a national of the Contracting State.93 Even though the Resolution was adopted by a large majority (17 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions), many of the Conference delegates who voted in favour of it did so merely as a humanitarian gesture, while remaining sceptical about its practical utility. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany considered that it was “in substance, a repetition of [Article 34 of the 1951 Convention], and it would be unwise for the Committee to adopt it”.94 Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides: The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.95 When confronted with this objection, Belgium replied exactly as it had done when defending the Recommendation in the Final Act of the 1954 Statelessness Convention: it pointed out that not all States participating in the Conference for the 1961 Convention were signatories of the Refugee Convention, thereby implying that there was a risk of refugees falling into a 90 91 92 93 94 95 A/CONF.9/SR.23, pp. 12 – 13. A/CONF.9/SR.24, p. 1. Article 1 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention, as applied to de facto stateless persons. Article 4 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention, as applied to de facto stateless persons. See comment of the Federal Republic of Germany: “The … draft resolution was, in substance, a repetition of that article, and it would be unwise for the Committee to adopt it” (A/CONF.9/C.1/SR.19, p. 8). A similar provision is contained in Article 32 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 25