Conclusions frequently. APBn officers largely confirmed the widespread existence of these practices. Moreover, the threat of forced relocation to Bhasan Char Island is increasingly being used to further deter Rohingya from violating movement restrictions. Finally, the Rohingya have endured forced labour at the hands of the APBn, being forced to serve night guard as they had previously experienced in Myanmar. It is difficult to justify the APBn presence as protection when they outsource their security duties to the community they are meant to serve while simultaneously perpetrating violence against them. It was noted repeatedly by respondents that conditions were not like this when the army was in control of the camp. Our results suggest that Rohingya are experiencing mass forced detention at the hands of the GoB, a clear violation of their human rights that is having dire consequences on Rohingya lives. Extortion and other forms of corruption by the APBn and other authorities are commonplace in the camps. APBn officers will often fabricate evidence to justify their actions, such as planting yaba on innocent Rohingya or accusing them of membership in ARSA or one of the other armed groups. The only way to escape punishment is by paying bribes. This has resulted in an extortive system of justice; justice will go to whoever can afford the highest bribe, whether criminal or innocent. Moreover, bribes must be paid to accomplish many aspects of basic functioning in the camps, including, but not limited to, crossing checkpoints, working, transporting necessities, seeking healthcare, carrying a mobile phone, holding weddings or funerals, and participating in religious life. These claims have been corroborated and clarified by APBn officers: although they report that practices of extortion are not taught as official policy, extortion is widespread and has, at times, been ordered by senior officers. One APBn officer reported that the amount one can extort will depend on their rank. Among Rohingya, many share the sentiment that police are in the camps to make money, not for their protection. In fact, as the fees and bribes continue while work opportunities dwindle, some Rohingya have had to resort to selling their food ration cards in order to afford the constant extortion. Understandably, the Rohingya’s trust in authority has deteriorated as Rohingya experience consistent abuse by those in power and have limited, if not non-existent, avenues for seeking justice. Our results emphasise the right to freedom of movement as a foundational human right: when movement is restricted, access to all other rights are also restricted. Movement restrictions have increased violence and security concerns throughout the camp as violence by armed groups has increased and Rohingya are left unable to escape. Rohingya health is also compromised by restrictions on movement as they prevent Rohingya from accessing food, proper hygiene, education, employment, safety, and quality healthcare–all of which are necessary to support good health. Rohingya are unable to leave the camps for work to make an income, so, because humanitarian aid is not sufficient, this means that most Rohingya are not able to meet their basic food and material needs. Access to education has also been limited as Rohingya children are prohibited from enrolling in local schools and Rohingya-led schools in the camps have been repeatedly shut down by authorities. Furthermore, current restrictions prevent Rohingya from fully practising their religion, as well as participating in important cultural events such as weddings and funerals. The GoB has justified the validity of these restrictions underneath the assumption that the Rohingya’s basic needs are met by the humanitarian organisations 80