183 In contrast to Woeser, my conversations with Sonam revolved around Tibetan politics. Sonam was firmly committed to Tibetan independence, a stance that opposed the moderate demand for autonomy advocated by the CTA. As we discussed the resistance movement, Sonam shared that there had been a noticeable rise in the participation of Tibetans in local elections in Himachal Pradesh, of which he did not approve. Curious, I inquired about Sonam’s and Tsering’s settlement in Sumdho. Sumdho lies on the margins of India, both geographically and economically. The Tibetans in Sumdho are primarily pastoralists, presenting a stark contrast in socioeconomic status to those residing in Dharamsala, or more populous Tibetan settlements in Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh. Upon my mentioning the prospect of Indian citizenship, Tsering responded with amusement, indicating that it was not a consideration for Sumdho’s Tibetans. Acquiring citizenship held little practical value, as they lacked financial resources to purchase land. Instead, they continued to utilize land leased to the Tibetan government-in-exile. For Sumdho’s residents, obtaining Indian citizenship would not enhance their material well-being or day-to-day lives. Their reliance on land provided by the Tibetan government-in-exile—combined with their modest economic status and traditional way of life—left them largely immune to the lure of Indian citizenship. INDIAN CITIZENSHIP AND TIBETAN POLITICAL FUTURE For many Tibetan refugees, loss of entitlements and withdrawal from the Tibetan community seems too high a price for citizenship. However, making this decision factors not only the “convenience” of citizenship but also the impact on the Tibetan political cause. This became evident when second-generation Tibetans were briefly granted the right to vote from 2014 to 2018. In response to court judgements in Delhi (2010) and Karnataka (2013) granting citizenship to second-generation Tibetans born before 1987, the Election Commission of India (ECI) issued a directive empowering eligible Tibetans to vote in Indian elections. This directive was issued even while passport offices across India continued rejecting Tibetan applications. While reasons for the misalignment among the different organs of the Indian government are beyond the scope of this essay, this revealed the discontinuities in the citizenship regime. The ECI’s 2014 directive was significant, granting second-generation Tibetans a voice in the country where they reside. Some viewed this as an opportunity to advocate for the Tibetan cause with the Indian state (Soumya, 2014). Many second-generation Tibetans cast votes in elections of their home states. However, while the ECI permitted Tibetans to vote, the MEA remained committed to preventing easy access. After the issuance of the 2017 memorandum, the Indian state mandated that Tibetans must forfeit RCs and related benefits to be eligible to vote. This created a dilemma, with many choosing to return voter IDs. This illustrates the trade-off Tibetan refugees face between their national identity and access to Indian citizenship. As I show below, some forgo citizenship to preserve their Tibetan identity, while others accept it to gain a political voice and further the Tibetan cause globally. Scholars have noted this latter viewpoint, with Tibetans in the West leveraging citizenship to uphold Tibetan sovereignty claims (Hess, 2006; McGranahan, 2018). In India, however, Tibetans were encouraged to stay stateless to strengthen their collective identity, support the exile government’s legitimacy, and to continue the Tibetan freedom movement (McConnell, 2013, 2016). More recently, while the CTA issues necessary certificates to those applying for citizenship, many feel an implicit coercion to not take up Indian citizenship. The pressure from the exile state and the economic conditions of their lives become reasons for many eligible for citizenship to remain stateless. This experience of persistent statelessness and precarity has influenced migration to the West. This trend is bolstered by the notion that the Global North affords what are perceived as “strong passports” (Lin, 2022) and that Tibetans will be able to act as “ambassadors” for the Tibetan cause (Hess, 2006).10 The migratory trend is coupled by the decreasing arrival of Tibetan refugees due to China’s strict border policies following the 2008 Tibetan uprising. Furthermore, recent conflict between India and China—the 2017 Doklam standoff and 2020 Galwan 15552934, 2024, 2, Downloaded from https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/plar.12580 by Test, Wiley Online Library on [07/03/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License DISAGGREGATING CITIZENSHIP