Frost C  omparative Migration Studies (2024) 12:23 decreased from 1.75 to 1.5 million dollars (Da‘ja, 2021).29 These changes highlight that implementation orders from the Cabinet shifted, and that these orders govern this policy, despite the absence of a nationality-by-investment provision in the nationality law. Moreover, senior officials are at the center of issuing the regulations for this policy. One high-level official, well-aware of this policy, explained that investment nationality is governed by decisions because they are more flexible than the law.30 Likewise, a former minister, with experience in this issue, remarked that “the nationality law is too hard to amend; if you touch it, then the discussion is all about the alternative homeland,”31 which refers to the political challenges of raising such reforms in more public settings, such as the parliament. Similarly, another high-level official, who had worked on these policies, observed that “you cannot imagine the negativity in the media about this [policy]…I was against having it in the media;” the same official stated that the policy is “not even a bylaw, it is regulations (‫ )تعليمات‬it is not a law” because “it does change often, if you put it in the law, it is not easy to change it.”32 Overall, hidden intentional ambiguity has characterized nationality-by-investment policies in Jordan. Palestinian‑Jordanians’ nationality revocations Unlike the previous examples, Palestinian-Jordanian access to nationality reflects how intentional ambiguity can reduce a group’s rights. Since Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, Palestinian-Jordanians that were displaced from the West to the East Bank after the 1967 War, whom I call the 67ers, have been subject to nationality revocations according to regulations that contradict the nationality law. The disengagement occurred on July 31, 1988, when King Hussein announced that Jordan was “dismantling the legal and administrative links” between the East and West Banks (Hussein Bin Talal, 1988). This announcement reduced Jordan to the East Bank alone and ended the Unity of the Banks that King Abdullah I oversaw in 1950. Although Israel had occupied the West Bank since the 1967 War, Jordan had maintained its legal, administrative, and political connections to the territory (Kingdom of Jordan, 1988b). However, the nationality law did not change in 1988,33 and the 1954 nationality law (and its amendments through 1987) continued to govern nationality acquisition and withdrawal. First, Article 3.2 stated that “Every non-Jewish person who carried Palestinian nationality before May 15, 1948 and whose typical residence was in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during the period between December 20, 1949 until February 16, 1954” is entitled to Jordanian nationality.34 Second, Article 18 stipulated that nationality revocation could occur when someone entered the military or civil service of a foreign state, without the prior permission of the Cabinet, and refused to leave, as well as when 29 The changes also state the provisions will be reviewed every six months, and new provisions will not apply retroactively (Jordan Times, 2021). 30 Former government official (NS52), June 2022. 31 Former minister (ME37), June 2022. The “alternative homeland (‫ ”)الوطن البديل‬refers to Jordanian concerns that Israel plans to make Jordan the alternative homeland of the Palestinians, where Israel would expel all Palestinians to Jordan. 32 33 Former government official (DT88), June 2022. The first time it changed after 1988 was in 2020, and it did not address the disengagement or update the provisions for losing nationality (Frost, 2022). 34 “Law Number 6 of 1954—Jordanian Nationality Law,” February 16, 1954. Page 12 of 18