Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017/03 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.), for example, has found as follows: It is generally accepted today that nationality is an inherent right of all human beings. Not only is nationality the basic requirement for the exercise of political rights, it also has an important bearing on the individual's legal capacity. Thus, despite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral and regulation of nationality are matters for each state to decide, contemporary developments indicate that international law does impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by th e states in that area, and that the manners in which states regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; those powers of the state are also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights. (…) The classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted by the state to its subjects, has gradually evolved to the point that nationality is today perceived as involving the jurisdiction of the state as well as human rights issues.5 The right to a nationality is enshrined in a range of international instruments,6 notably the American Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC guarantees and protects the right of all children to be registered immediately after birth; their right to a name, to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, their right to know and be cared for by their parents.7 It also requires States Parties to ensure these rights are implemented in accordance with national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments, in particular where a child would otherwise be stateless.8 Article 20(2) of the American Convention states that every person has the right to acquire the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born, if he does not have the right to any other nationality. In the view of the Inter-American Court, “This principle must be interpreted in light of the obligation to ensure the exercise of the rights to all persons subject to the State’s jurisdiction, established in Article 1(1) of the Convention. Hence, a State must be certain that a child born in its territory may truly acquire the nationality of another immediately after birth, if he does not acquire the nationality of the State in whose territory he was born.9 To determine if such a right exists, a State must also weigh the factors that could preclude access.10 Eventual nationality elsewhere —if the territorial State’s obligation is not to apply— must be a material, immediate fact, not mere hypothesis.11 Entitlement to a certain nationality —i.e., because the 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, paras. 32-33. 6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 15), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 24), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Art. 5), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Art. 9), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Art. 29), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Art. 18), and Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 7). In the Inter-American System, the American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 20) and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Art. XIX). 7 CRC, Art. 7.1. 8 CRC, Art. 7.2. 9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, judgment of August 28, 2014. 10 Id., para. 261. 11 In response to the Dominican Republic’s contention that claimants did not face statelessness under jus sanguinis provisions in the Haitian Constitution, and that it was thus exempted from granting them nationality under Art. 20(2), the Court noted: “…[E]xpert witness Julia Harrington… indicated that ‘a theoretical nationality available in another State does not constitute citizenship of that State. Although it may be considered that a person possesses or can obtain another nationality owing to his ethnic or national background, it cannot be presumed that he has that nationality unless he possesses proof or recognition of this; in particular, the possibility of claiming another nationality 2