Ramesh Ganohariti The answer to our first question is thus: If international law is to regulate oppressive nationality attribution as a category of its own, it can only do so in cases where a recognized state is involved in citizenship attribution towards people living outside its de iure territory. Was citizenship attributed collectively and forcefully? As identified by the previous contributors, it is difficult to follow a strict consent/non-consent dichotomy when it comes to acquisition of citizenship, but this is essential to consider when designing any potential legal frameworks. Eleanor Knott argued that post-annexation passportisation in Crimea was used as a coercive practice to force (most) individuals to acquire Russian citizenship.113 On the other hand, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the acquisition of Russian citizenship was voluntary and on an individual basis. This is demonstrated by the fact that not all Abkhazians and South Ossetians managed to acquire Russian citizenship in the early 2000s. It is also important to acknowledge that Russia’s passportisation in aspirant states is in response to a demand from the people who wish to acquire a more strategic/compensatory citizenship with greater instrumental value than their local citizenship. Thus, individual agency needs to be considered.114 The fact that Russia highjacked the individual agency of residents of aspirant states for geo-political and strategic reasons does not eliminate the necessity and legitimacy of Russian citizenship in the eyes of these populations. A strong argument exists against collective attribution, but it would be more challenging to regulate and identify cases where citizenship was acquired voluntarily and on an individual basis. Thus, any international legal regulation should only address cases of collective and forceful attribution of citizenship. Did the weaponisation occur simultaneously with the attribution of citizenship? The last question is whether or not the weaponisation of citizenship occurred after or before passportisation. What may have been a benevolent or humanitarian act could easily be weaponised later. This ties to the above-mentioned dimension and to Jelena Džankić’s point that most acquisitions are voluntary ‘even if these are offered for instrumental purposes by states and prone to misuse by them’.115 Extraterritorial nationality attribution that could potentially result in the weaponisation of citizenship (such as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) is more difficult to regulate since it would involve pre-emptive regulation. On the other hand, when passportisation is used as part of a package of coercive means to achieve geo-political goals and engage in warfare, it should be regulated and condemned. Thus, it is vital to differentiate Russia’s actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia from those in Ukraine. In the former cases, there was a significant time gap between the initial passportisation in the early 2000s and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and the need ‘to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens”’ was, from the aspirant state’s perspective, rightfully used as an argument to intervene.116 When Russia engaged in extraterritorial naturalization, it did not do so with the clear objective of using passportisation as a geo-political tool. In contrast, Russia weaponised citizenship in Crimea (2014) and Eastern Ukraine (2019-present) within the context of a broader conflict. It used passportisation to gain and justify control over the territory and population. While I acknowledge that determining temporal precedence is difficult, I believe that if the extraterritorial naturalization occurred significantly before its weaponisation, it should not be regarded as an instance of oppressive nationality attribution. That said, if weaponisation occurs post facto, international law could still reprimand the state, but only after it begins weaponising an already granted nationality. 113 Knott 2022. 114 Harpaz Y. (2019), ‘Compensatory citizenship: dual nationality as a strategy of global upward mobility,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45:6, 897-916. 115 Džankić 2022. 116 ‘Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia’, Kremlin RU, 8 August 2008, Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia • President of Russia (kremlin.ru). 21 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies