Conditions for regulating the weaponisation of citizenship have access to the Georgian healthcare system.102 While my interlocutors were grateful for the provision of healthcare, they cited past cases where some hospitalized individuals were expected to sign documents acknowledging the acceptance of Georgian citizenship. Thus, from their perspective, Georgia is engaging in a subtle form of oppressive citizenship policy. That said, under the current international system, little can be done to control states using citizenship laws to regulate populations within their sovereign territory. Peter Spiro argues that even though ius solis and ius sanguinis are both forms of ascriptive citizenship, they have been accepted as legitimate criteria for conferring citizenship.103 The attribution would be within the state’s competence and should not be regarded as a weaponisation of citizenship as it is not directed against another state, even if a particular subset of the population does not accept it. Furthermore, international law has been more concerned with forceful denaturalisation and statelessness reduction and views attempts to ensure that individuals have access to a nationality within the reduction of statelessness framework.104 Nevertheless, I envisage that this dimension may push us to think about states’ coercive use of nationality beyond extraterritorial nationality attribution and citizenship-stripping. The other instances of weaponisation of citizenship that would be difficult to restrict under international law are processes of passportisation and documentation carried out by non-state actors, which can range from aspirant states (e.g. Abkhazia),105 to rebel groups (e.g. in Syria).106 The extreme case is ISIS, a terrorist group which engaged in state-like functions.107 The degree of voluntariness in acquiring documentation and citizenship of non-state actors may differ, but in most cases people are compelled to do so. Even in Abkhazia, where the majority identify as Abkhazians and have voluntarily accepted the local citizenship, some ethnic Georgians were compelled (20082013) to acquire Abkhazian citizenship in order to enjoy certain rights.108 Abkhaz authorities consider such acquisitions of Abkhazian citizenship voluntary. While any forceful attribution of citizenship must be condemned, it would not be possible to regulate these actors the same way as states. Doing so would be politically unacceptable since this would mean that the international system would give recognized states and these actors the same status. The non-recognized status, however, does not absolve the aspirant state authorities. International humanitarian law109 and international criminal law establish accountability for non-state actors for acts that violate human rights.110 However, in cases of peacetime, responsibility for human rights violations falls upon the patron state that supports the aspirant state.111 While, to my knowledge, no international case law exists on the weaponisation of citizenship by non-state actors, any international legal regulation will likely draw upon the existing legal regimes. Thus, under international law, in the case of Abkhazia, Russia may be recognized as the responsible party for the forceful ascription of Abkhazian citizenship. Furthermore, due to the non-recognition of these actors as states, their citizenship (laws) and documents remain largely unrecognized.112 Thus, legally, it would not be possible to call these acts “weaponisation of nationality”, and an alternative legal term needs to be found. 102 Bakradze N. (2022), Georgia’s Health Diplomacy, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Georgia’s Health Diplomacy | Institute for War and Peace Reporting (iwpr.net). 103 Spiro 2017. 104 Vink M. et. al. (2022), Instrumentalising Citizenship in the fight against terrorism, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and Global Citizenship Observatory, Instrumentalising_Citizenship_Global_Trends_Report.pdf (institutesi.org). 105 Kvarchelia L. (2014), Abkhazia: Issues of citizenship and security, Centre for Humanitarian Programme. 106 Sosnowski M. (2021), “The Right to Have Rights”: Legal Identity Documentation in the Syrian Civil War, German Institute for Global and Area Studies. 107 Callimachi R., ‘The ISIS Files: When terrorists run the city hall’, New York Times, 4 April 2018, The ISIS Files: When Terrorists Run City Hall - The New York Times (nytimes.com). 108 ‘Living in Limbo: Rights of Ethnic Georgians Returnees to the Gali District of Abkhazia’, Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2011, Living in Limbo: Rights of Ethnic Georgians Returnees to the Gali District of Abkhazia | HRW. 109 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 4427_002_ International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts – Recommitting To Protection In Armed Conflict On The 70th Anniversary Of The Geneva Conventions; 10.2019; 500 (icrc.org). 110 Ambos K., ‘The new enemy of mankind: The Jurisdiction of the ICC over members of “Islamic State”’, EJIL: Talk!, 26 November 2015, The new enemy of mankind: The Jurisdiction of the ICC over members of “Islamic State” – EJIL: Talk! (ejiltalk.org). 111 Cwicinskaja, N. (2018), ‘International Human Rights Law and Territorial Non-State Actors: Cases of the Council of Europe Region’, in Summers J. and Gough A. (Eds.), Non-State Actors and International Obligations, Brill | Nijhoff. 112 Krasniqi G., Contested territories, liminal polities, performative citizenship: a comparative analysis, GLOBALCIT Working Paper, EUI RSCAS, 2018/13. European University Institute 20