AUAD v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT 17 Brigade], backed by pro-Syrian leftist groups, had established dominance over mainstream Fatah forces in the camp, in part because many of Arafat’s most loyal commanders had been transferred to the West Bank and Gaza.’ MEIB noted that ‘Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which had only a limited presence in the camp until the mid-1990s, coordinated closely with Maqdah and were allowed to distribute Iranian funds to expand their bases of support.’ 6.150 Esbat al-Ansar, the League of Partisans, has also had a presence in Ein el-Hilweh for over two decades and, ‘In the [sic] late 1998, Esbat al-Ansar began receiving significant funding from al-Qaeda, thoroughly transforming both its infrastructure and its goals. The group’s military wing, which now paid recruits monthly salaries for the first time, grew to a force of 150-300 fighters, dozens of whom were sent to bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan.’ Due to its increased financial resources, the group was able to buy weapons and also move more freely, as members could now pay the bribes needed to pass through Lebanese security checkpoints. The latter benefit meant that ‘It quickly established close links with radical Islamists in the northern port of Tripoli and the nearby Badawi and Nahr el-Bared refugee camps.’ 6.151 Syrian concerns over the rise of Islamist groups in the camp resulted in the Syrian authorities allowing Fatah to reassert its authority in the Ein al-Hilweh, which included Mounir Maqdah who had rejoined Fatah in late 1998, primarily by pouring Palestinian Authority (PA) funds into the camp. However, with the in absentia conviction of Fatah’s leader in Lebanon, Sultan Abu al-Aynayn [based in Rashidieh camp], of forming an armed gang and the subsequent arrest of three senior Fatah officials, Syrian support of Fatah’s authority in Ein el-Hilweh was again curtailed, seemingly in favour of Esbat al-Ansar. 6.152 MEIB also recounted the presence of other groups in Ein el-Hilweh, such as Jamal Suleiman’s Fatah’s Martyrs’ Battalion; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the 10 to 20 fighters who constituted the remnants of the Dinniyeh Group – initially a 200-300 strong group of Islamic militants who, in January 2000, had failed in an attempt to establish an Islamic ‘mini-state’ in north Lebanon – who fled to Ein el-Hilweh following the defeat of the group by 13,000 Lebanese troops; and the Esbat al-Ansar breakaway group – Esbat al-Nour – which was led by the eldest son of the original group’s founder: ‘[Abdullah] Shreidi attracted only a few dozen of the [Esbat al-Ansar] movement’s fighters, as well as the Dinniyeh militants for whom he had provided shelter.’ The article states that ‘Another small, but important al-Qaeda affiliate is Al-Haraka al-Islamiya al-Mujahida (The Islamic Struggle Movement), led by Sheikh Jamal Khattab, the imam of Al-Nour Mosque in the Safsaf neighbourhood of Ain al-Hilweh.’ 6.153 MEIB detailed the fluctuating nature of power within the camp, reporting on the various outside influences of the Syrian and Iranian regimes, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda, and also the political and physical conflicts between the groups inside Ein el-Hilweh.” 56. The United Kingdom Border and Immigration Agency periodically issues Operational Guidance Notes (“OGNs”) which evaluate the general, political and human rights situation in a given country and provide guidance on the nature and handling of the most common types of asylum or subsidiary protection claims by persons fleeing that country.