Water 2020, 12, 340 14 of 28 Secondly, the UNWC states that when unavoidable harm has been caused, efforts to eliminate or mitigate this harm shall be taken in consultation with the affected state. What if the affected party is not a universally recognised state? This problem is applicable to Palestine, which has been recognised as a state by the UN but not by Israel, the occupying power of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This problem applies to civil wars such as in Syria, in which defined negotiating partners for post-conflict consultation do not exist. Article 3 of Convention I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, “Conflicts Not of an International Character”, addresses civil wars briefly and without regard to resource/water access [76]. The UNWC also insufficiently accounts for internal conflicts and their profound impacts on water infrastructure and access. In cases of belligerent occupation, how can occupying governments be expected to have equal “consultation” about the best way to prevent harm to the same civilian infrastructures that are targeted? Thirdly, the UNWC is problematic because it requires a harm-causing state and a harmed state to “discuss the question of compensation”, “where appropriate”. Who determines when the “appropriate” time to discuss compensation occurs, and how is this determination made? A process to designate a neutral third party to carry out this task is not outlined. A path to strengthening the UNWC is to replace this weak language about mere “discussion” with required reparations for incidents such as the bombing of wastewater treatment facilities. As Evans notes, “There is a common misconception that reparations are synonymous with monetary compensation” when reparations actually encompass financial and non-financial meanings: “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction (disclosure of the truth), and guarantees of non-repetition” for victims of human rights violations [28]. The international law of belligerent occupation states that occupying powers are obligated to not directly worsen lives of occupied civilians—funding the reconstruction of essential water infrastructure is a reasonable and achievable expectation to place on occupying powers [77]. A precedent exists for revising the Geneva Conventions and adding information influenced by other laws. This historical precedent strengthens the case for why aspects of the UNWC should not only be amended and improved within that document but should then be duplicated within the Geneva Conventions themselves. Alongside establishment of an enforceable, independent human right to water, this would demonstrate how environmental factors are inextricable from civilian protection during armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions were legally amended as recently as 2005, when a new protocol regarding the use of ICRC’s emblems was adopted [78]. The addition of a similarly structured protocol on water during extended occupation would be one possibility to facilitate interaction between water law and the Geneva Conventions. Such a protocol could place a time frame on the period during which an occupying power has to meet obligations to make reparations for destruction—intentional or unintentional—of civilian infrastructure. Such a protocol would need to outline steps through which an independent commission—including representatives from both the harm-causing and harmed parties—could determine a monetary amount needed for civilian infrastructure reconstruction, in addition to a separate monetary amount calculated for unrecoverable losses (catastrophic injuries/civilian deaths). The monetary amount for unrecoverable losses might include lost earning potentials, paid as reparations to the injured or family members of the deceased. Another possibility, perhaps more expedient, which has been implemented previously as an interim step to formal IHL revision, is to address water access and quality during protracted conflict in the next Updated Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC’s Updated Commentaries “give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today’s armed conflicts . . . ” [79]. The Commentaries are intended as “an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers and lawyers to be able to ensure protection of victims during armed conflict”. They are used to “ensure that military orders comply with law. They are also used by judges in criminal courts and ad-hoc tribunals” [79]. Updates to the Commentaries calling for increased