2. Institutionalised Arbitrariness Conclusion In sum, the Foreigners Tribunals in Assam fail to meet the most basic legal and normative standards required of adjudicatory bodies, both under the Indian Constitution and international human rights law. Lacking legislative foundation, judicial independence, and meaningful oversight, these tribunals operate under the shadow of executive control. Their members are appointed through opaque, politically vulnerable processes, with limited tenure security, inadequate qualifications, and no guarantee of impartiality or competence. The structural deficiencies are not incidental—they are systemic, and they shape the outcomes of citizenship determinations in ways that disproportionately harm already marginalised communities. This institutional design corrodes the rule of law and undermines fundamental rights by turning life-altering decisions into administrative formalities. When the tribunals empowered to determine whether someone is a citizen function without independence, impartiality, or competence, the process ceases to be adjudication in any meaningful sense. Rather, it becomes a bureaucratic instrument of exclusion masquerading as law. These institutional failures demand urgent scrutiny and reform, for they speak not only to procedural injustice but to a broader legal architecture of dispossession. 162 Administrative Court Regulations [Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO)] 1960 (Germany), ss 15-17, 68-73. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949, art 97. Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) 1976 (Germany), s 21; Administrative Court Regulations 1960 (n 164) s 54. 165 Government of Canada, ‘Citizenship Commission’ (31 March 2007) <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/ mandate/citizenship-commission.html> accessed 19 December 2024. 166 Government of Canada, ‘Citizenship judge code of conduct’ (27 January 2017) <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/ corporate/mandate/citizenship-commission/citizenship-judge-code-conduct.html> accessed 19 December 2024. 167 ibid. 168 Canadian Passport Order SI/81-86, Rule 9, 10. 169 Ivory Coast Nationality Code (Code de la Nationalite Ivoirienne) 1961, art 77; Questions of a person’s status as an Ivorian national or as a foreigner are considered matters of “public order”. Civil courts, in exercise of their ordinary civil jurisdiction, are competent to hear disputes on nationality. 170 Constitution of Ivory Coast (Constitution de la République de Côte d’Ivoire) 2016, art 139. 171 Law No. 78-662 of 4 August 1978 establishing the status of the Judiciary (Ivory Coast), art 5. 172 ibid chapter 2. 173 Refworld, ‘United Kingdom: Special Immigrations Appeals Commission (SIAC)’ <https://www.refworld.org/document-sources/united-kingdomspecial-immigration-appeals-commission-siac> accessed 28 December 2024. 174 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003 (UK) (amended from time to time) contain provisions providing inter alia guidance on what dealing with a case fairly and justly means (Rule 6), the power of the Tribunal to issue directions as to the issues on which it requires submissions or evidence (Rule 14). The Tribunal may also admit evidence whether or not such evidence may be admissible in a civil trial in the United Kingdom (Rule 14). See further Rules 44, 46 & 53 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules, 2003. 175 The chairman of a panel hearing each SIAC is a person who is a High Court judge, with the second member drawn from a panel of judges experienced in hearing appeals on ordinary immigration matters and a third member with experience of analyzing and assessing secret intelligence [Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, para 5 of Schedule I]. 163 164 63