6. Conclusion 6.1 The Rule of Law: Institutional Design, Legal Foundations, and Adjudicative Integrity At the heart of this report lies a foundational concern: that the FT system in Assam is structurally incompatible with the principle of the rule of law as enshrined in both Indian constitutional law and international human rights law. This is not a claim about isolated procedural irregularities. It is a critique of the FT system’s foundational design—its institutional architecture, its legal basis, and its operational logic—which together create a regime that is incapable of delivering lawful, fair, or constitutionally compliant adjudication of citizenship. Under Indian constitutional law, the rule of law requires that any body entrusted with adjudicating the rights, liberties, or legal status of individuals must do so through procedures that are just, fair, and reasonable, as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. International human rights law complements these requirements. Article 14 of the ICCPR, to which India is a State party, affirms the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law. Article 16 of the ICCPR affirms the right to recognition as a person before the law, while Article 9 prohibits arbitrary detention, and Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms not to be arbitrarily deprived of the right to a nationality. Based on these norms, the report argues that where an institution exercises adjudicatory powers— determining facts, applying legal standards, and issuing binding decisions—it must meet the minimum requirements of a court-like structure. These include independence from executive control, a basis in law, appointment of legally qualified decision-makers, and the availability of safeguards such as appeal and judicial oversight. These safeguards are not optional—they are constitutional essentials, especially where a body displaces the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. This is precisely the case with FTs in Assam. As Chapter 2 of this report demonstrates, FTs have emerged not as supplementary but as replacement institutions. They now exercise exclusive authority over the determination of citizenship in Assam, effectively displacing the jurisdiction of civil courts. And yet, despite adjudicating questions that go to the core of constitutional personhood—such as whether an individual is entitled to rights, status, protection from detention, or even presence in the country—they operate entirely outside the judicial structure and its safeguards. They are not creatures of statute. The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, under which they are constituted, is not legislation passed by Parliament but an executive notification issued under the colonial-era Foreigners Act, 1946—a statute that provides no meaningful framework for the establishment of independent, impartial adjudicatory bodies. There is no statutory specification of appointment, tenure, qualifications, or appeal. In essence, citizenship adjudication in Assam has been transferred to a body that is untethered from the legal infrastructure that normally governs adjudication under the Constitution. 176