Secondly, while it is true that Helu is not strictly binding, as a decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, one would expect it to be taken seriously unless there is some good reason to distinguish it. While there certainly are differences between s 9(1)(c) and the statutory appeal right on which Helu depended, none of them provide a basis to distinguish Helu on the key point that questions of private harm can be relevant to the public interest. Indeed, if anything, the case for giving the concept of public interest some kind of humanitarian content is stronger under s 9(1)(c). This is because the statutory provision at issue in Helu set out two distinct and sequential tests – the first focusing on the severity of the impact of the decision on the applicant and the second ruling out cases that were contrary to the public interest. It is therefore at least possible to argue (although I do not necessarily suggest the argument is correct) that the Supreme Court’s approach in Helu gave rise to a form of “double counting” – that is, that it allowed the same humanitarian considerations to be counted at both stages of the sequential inquiry.74 No such “double counting” problem arises under s 9(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act. In contradistinction to the provision at issue in Helu, s 9(1)(c) does not set out two distinct sequential inquiries. Rather, the language of s 9(1)(c) states one test. The Minister must be satisfied that the decision is in the public interest, and he must be satisfied that test is met because of the exceptional humanitarian (or other) circumstances. The humanitarian circumstances thus function, not as a separate and distinct statutory standard, but as one of the allowable evidential bases from which the presence of a public interest can be assessed. In short, if anything, the recognition in Helu that a public interest can arise out of humanitarian circumstances is more, rather than less, apposite in the s 9(1)(c) context because the language of s 9(1)(c) demands an integrated approach to the “exceptional circumstances” and “public interest” elements. A third reason reinforcing the conclusion that the Department was right to adopt the Helu approach is that similar acknowledgement of the fact that a public interest can be grounded in harm to individuals is found in at least one other statutory context. The phrase “public interest” litters the New Zealand statute book but is only defined on one occasion.75 Section 68(2) of the Evidence Act 2006 allows judges to override the confidentiality of a journalist’s source if, in the particular case, “the public interest in the disclosure of evidence” (of the source’s identity) outweighs certain other listed factors. Section 68(5) then stipulates that the phrase “public interest in the disclosure of evidence”: “includes, in a criminal proceeding, the defendant’s right to present an effective defence”. Although this is the only definition section in which the phrase “public interest” appears, other provisions in the Evidence Act refer to specific public interests in terms that similarly acknowledge the link between public interest and private harm. Thus, s 69(2) of the Evidence Act (also relating to the protection of confidences) requires a judge to weigh, amongst other things, “the public interest in … preventing harm to a person by whom, about whom, or on whose behalf the confidential information was obtained, recorded, or prepared or to whom it was communicated”.76 Section 69(3) requires judges, when undertaking that weighing exercise, to have regard (amongst other things) to “society’s interest in protecting the privacy of victims of offences and, in particular, victims of sexual offences.” And s 119B of the Evidence Act (relating to the disclosure of certain 74 See for example Zanzoul, above n 48, at [149], [173], where this argument was made by the Crown (although not ultimately accepted). 75 The phrase “public interest” appears in more than 250 current Acts of Parliament: “Statutes of New Zealand” Westlaw NZ <www.westlaw.co.nz> (search on 15 May 2017 for the phrase “public interest” in free text in Acts in force). 76 See Andersen v Hawke [2016] NZHC 2280. 16 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3094731