decision.59 Helu is thus of relevance to us because it considered the relationship between such an inquiry (into individual humanitarian predicament) and the notion of public interest.60 McGrath J (expressing the reasons of the majority)61 considered that, in the particular context, the two statutory tests (“unjust and unduly harsh” and “not contrary to the public interest”) involved distinct and separate inquiries.62 The public interest inquiry necessitated a broad “overall judgment” of the circumstances,63 with the focus being on the “community’s”, rather than the individual’s, interests.64 In the particular statutory context, issues such as the “likelihood of recidivism” and “the nature and seriousness of prospective future offending” would be important considerations.65 Nevertheless, McGrath J accepted that there was overlap between the two inquiries. Specifically, the factors relevant to the assessment of whether the deportation would be “unjust or unduly harsh” remained potentially relevant to the “public interest” inquiry (albeit, at that stage of the analysis, they would be “viewed through a different lens”).66 In short, factors relevant to the individual’s humanitarian predicament can ground a public interest because the public has an interest in “avoiding unjust or unduly harsh outcomes”.67 More specifically (and of relevance to Roland Kun’s case), McGrath J recognised that there is: - - A public interest in “maintaining the unity of families which contributes to the well-being and stability of the community”. This, he said, “reflects the affirmation in art 23(1) of the [ICCPR] of the importance of the family unit”;68 and A particular public interest in “the protection of young members of society”, as affirmed both by domestic legislation and international law.69 In order to determine the extent to which these aspects of the public interest are implicated, the particular circumstances of the appellant and his/her family must be given individual consideration, along with any other factors relevant to the public interest in the particular case.70 In short, the position (at least in the immigration context) is as follows. An individual’s humanitarian circumstances might not be determinative of the public interest, but they are potentially relevant to it. This is not because the private interests of an individual are, themselves, at stake in a public interest assessment. Rather, it is because the community has an interest in ensuring the fair and humane treatment of the individuals that constitute it. Although the categories of human suffering that might implicate the public interest are by no means closed, Helu recognises a 59 See Guo v Minister of Immigration [2015] NZSC 132, [2016] 1 NZLR 248 at [9]. Relevantly, the New Zealand courts have not considered the absence of a reference to “exceptional humanitarian circumstances” an obstacle to applying the guidance in Helu to the s 207(1) appeal right: for example Fagauta v Minister of Immigration [2017] NZHC 162; Nacis v Minister of Immigration [2016] NZHC 2627; Wu v Minister of Immigration [2016] NZHC 1309; Tuitupou [2015] NZHC 3158. See also Guo, above n 59, at [8]. 61 He was joined by William Young and Arnold JJ as to the underlying principles, and by Elias CJ and Glazebrook J as to the result. 62 At [157], [167]. 63 At [168], [175]. 64 At [170]. 65 At [168], [173]. 66 At [170]. See also at [157], [167], [169], [189]. 67 At [169]. 68 At [171], [194]. 69 At [172], [187]. Elias CJ and Glazebrook J disagreed with McGrath J on the relationship between the two tests (which they saw as being one of proportionality). However, they agreed with McGrath J that there was a public interest in the fair treatment of individuals, in the unity of families, and in the observance of human rights: at [10], [74], [76], [85], [97] per Elias CJ; at [207], [210] per Glazebrook J. 70 At [166]–[177], [197]. See also at [210] per Glazebrook J. 60 13 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3094731