applicant”. On the other hand, the concept of “public interest” directs the attention outward, inviting a broad and polycentric assessment of the interests of the community at large. This tension is particularly acute in the context of s 9(1)(c) because of the close nexus the section dictates between the two concepts that underlie it. There are two points to note in this respect. First, for the Minister to grant citizenship under s 9(1)(c), he or she must be positively satisfied that a grant of citizenship “would be” in the public interest. This is another point of distinction from the immigration context. In s 207(1) of the Immigration Act and its various predecessors, there is no requirement that the public interest be positively advanced by granting the relevant application. Rather, the deciding body simply needs to be satisfied that allowing the appellant to remain in New Zealand will not be contrary to the public interest. By contrast, the public interest requirement in s 9(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act is far more stringent.48 Secondly, for s 9(1)(c) to be triggered, the requisite public interest must be “because of” the exceptional circumstances. In other words, it is not enough that both exceptional circumstances and a public interest coexist; the latter must arise directly out of the former. This is, in a strict sense, impossible, given the inherently polycentric nature of an assessment of the public interest. Such an assessment invites consideration, in the round, of all the circumstances; not just those that meet the qualifying threshold of “exceptional”. In order to make s 9(1)(c) work, therefore, it is surely necessary to gloss the statutory requirement with a qualifier such as “in part because of” or perhaps “substantially because of”. However, even accepting that gloss, in cases involving humanitarian circumstances, the nexus requirement presents something of a conundrum. When, one might ask, might humanitarian circumstances relating to a particular applicant give rise to a positive public interest in a grant of citizenship? One can easily see how “other” circumstances might qualify. These might relate, for example, to particular skills or unusual wealth that the applicant will bring with them to New Zealand. And as we have seen, Roland Kun’s application did rely, in part, on circumstances of this kind, highlighting the public interest in retaining in New Zealand two talented professionals of high calibre and international reputation. But the difficulty, as we have also seen, is that this dimension of the Kun family’s circumstances had less claim to be considered “exceptional” than the family’s humanitarian predicament (and, indeed, was not ultimately so considered by the Department). The nexus requirement therefore demanded that a public interest be seen to arise from the humanitarian circumstances themselves. Let us, then, re-state the legal conundrum. When, if indeed ever, might humanitarian circumstances relating to a particular applicant give rise to a positive public interest in a grant of citizenship? The answer to that question depends on the meaning that is given to the concept of “public interest”. The legal significance of Roland Kun’s case lies in the fact that, over the course of determining his application, the Department of Internal Affairs revised its settled approach to that question. 4. The settled approach: public interest as positive benefit or advantage Up to, and at the time of, Mr Kun’s citizenship application (which was submitted in late 2015 and determined in mid-2016), the approach taken by the Department of Internal Affairs to the meaning of “public interest” was reflected in two documents that were available at that time on the Department’s website.49 The first, entitled “Grant of Citizenship in Special Cases”, purported to set 48 See Zanzoul v Removal Review Authority HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-1333, 9 June 2009, at [152]. “Grant of Citizenship in Special Cases”; “Information sheet: Exceptional circumstances for citizenship”. These two documents have since been removed from the Department’s website but are on file with the author. 49 10 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3094731