THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS 80 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 2017 [Vol. 19 encouraged to assist those who are de facto stateless.224 The likeness between de facto statelessness and the Inter-American Court’s “risk of statelessness” doctrine compels further examination, with important implications for statelessness protection. The historical context in which the 1954 Convention was ultimately promulgated is an important starting point for this presentation of the de facto statelessness dilemma. As discussed above, the international community was animated by a concern for “unprotected” persons when it convened to deliberate about legal protection for refugees and stateless persons after the Second World War. Refugees were unprotected as a matter of fact, while stateless persons were unprotected as a matter of law. Notably, the refugee definition set forth in the 1951 Convention did not encompass all people who were factually unprotected; rather, it was aimed at protecting only those who feared persecution in their country because of some protected characteristic.225 The 1954 Convention, on the other hand, extended protection to all persons who were legally unprotected by virtue of their lack of a nationality link to any country. In arriving at the definition of “stateless person,” the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons discussed the de facto statelessness concept at length.226 There was a suggestion that an expansive idea of de facto statelessness should be incorporated into the definition of stateless person. Specifically, the United Kingdom argued for a broad understanding of de facto statelessness, which would include persons who were “refused” or “deprived” of protection by their state of nationality.227 The Conference did not take up this suggestion. Ultimately, while the precise term “de facto stateless” does not appear anywhere in the body of the Convention,228 the Final Act encouraged each state party to provide the protection of the Convention in cases “when it recognizes as valid the reasons for which a person has renounced the protection of the State of which he is a national.”229 Notably, this provision only covered persons who had renounced the protection of their country of nationality, and the instrument did not create any obligation to protect such persons. A Conference that convened in 1959, and then again in 1961 to finish its work on the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, also demonstrated some concern about de facto statelessness.230 Again, that Conference declined to include any binding legal obligations for state parties to protect de facto stateless persons.231 Rather, it included a recommendation in its Final Act that “persons who are stateless de facto 224. See, e.g., VAN WAAS, supra note 79, at 19-27; Massey, supra note 28, at 17, 23; Jason E. Tucker, Questioning De Facto Statelessness by Looking at De Facto Citizenship, 19 TILBURG L. REV. 277, 277-78 (2014). 225. See 1951 Convention, supra note 73, art. 1(A). 226. Massey, supra note 28, at 17. 227. Id. at 18. 228. Id. 229. Id. at 17. 230. Id. at 23. 231. Id. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529