historic experiences of forced displacement and returns combine to produce considerable insecurities for Rohingyas in the camps of Bangladesh. In a study by X-Borders Local Research Initiative, 97% of camp residents surveyed stated that they were “very worried” about potential forcible return to Myanmar. This was ranked highest of the concerns about camp life, above lack of work and livelihood opportunities.80 A further concern for Rohingyas is the potential for them to be moved against their will to the remote and unstable island, Bhasan Char, which has been purpose built for accommodating refugees.81 Smart Cards: Disempowerment and Fears of Forced Returns The registration of Rohingya refugees was closed between 1993 and 2017 to discourage further arrivals from Myanmar. As such, fewer than 30,000 Rohingya, who arrived in the early 1990s were registered by UNHCR, and hundreds of thousands of unregistered Rohingya lived in the surrounding areas without access to the right to live or work in Bangladesh. As hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled across the border in 2017, the government of Bangladesh agreed to host the refugees and open registration. In conjunction with IOM, Rohingya arrivals were registered and provided with ID cards. They were also given ration books. These documents enabled the state and NGOs to organise emergency aid and humanitarian assistance. Given Bangladesh’s historic experience of hosting and the difficulties involved in returning Rohingya refugees, the efficient registration of these populations was also seen as important in ensuring that Myanmar accept the refugees back into Myanmar in the future.82 Registration, then, served the dual purpose of providing access to vital rations and services, and evidencing Rohingyas right of return. As camp infrastructure grew, and repatriations were discussed, UNHCR’s role in coordinating humanitarian support and protecting camp-based refugees grew. Meanwhile, in 2018, UNHCR, UNDP and the Government of Myanmar signed an MOU relating to future repatriations. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh objected on the basis that they were neither consulted, nor allowed to see the contents of the agreement. Leaked drafts of the MOU circulated in the camps.83 In particular, refugees worried that according to the leaked agreement, Myanmar’s Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population (MoLIP) was responsible for verifying and issuing identity cards to Rohingya on return.84 The primary concern was that returnees would be forced to undergo national verification and potentially be forced to accept the deeply divisive NVC cards, that they associated with Myanmar’s genocide.85 Legitimate fears and concerns circulated about the international community’s past inabilities to both prevent refoulement and ensure the safety of returned Rohingya. Since UNHCR had a presence in Northern Rakhine monitoring previous repatriations, many of the worries centred around its role.86 Within this context in 2018, UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh began to roll out a new ID card system, popularly known as the “smart card”. It required Rohingya refugees to submit fingerprints, iris scans and biographic information which were then linked to the card. According to UNHCR, the smart card was “for the purposes of protection, identity management, documentation, provision of assistance, population statistics and ultimately solutions for an estimated 900,000 refugees.”87 However, according to The Engine Room, government officials of the Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC), who were directly involved in implementing the ID system, also described the smart cards as being used for the purposes of “separating” refugees from Bangladeshi populations and for “repatriations”.88 The Asia Foundation and BRAC University, ‘Navigating at the Margins: Family, Mobility and Livelihoods Amongst Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’ (2020) available at: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Navigating-the-Margins_Family-Mobility-and-Livelihoods-Amongst-Rohingya-in-Bangladesh.pdf [accessed 11/11/2020] 81 B. Adams, ‘For Rohingya, Bangladesh’s Bhasan Char ‘Will Be Like a Prison’ Human Rights Watch (March 2019) available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/ rohingya-bangladeshs-bhasan-char-will-be-prison [accessed 11/11/2020] 82 This is also noted in the Memorandum of Understanding between Bangladesh and Myanmar which notes that refugee registration cards can be used as proof of residency in Myanmar for the purpose of implementing returns. ‘Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar’, (November 2017) available at: http://www.theindependentbd.com/assets/images/banner/linked_file/20171125094240.pdf [accessed 13/11/2020] 83 ‘Memorandum of Understanding between GoM and UNDP and UNHCR (June 2018) A copy of the leaked MOU (dated a dew days before it was signed) is available at: https://freerohingyacoalition.org/en/the-mou-between-myanmar-government-and-undp-and-unhcr/ [accessed 11/11/2020]. 84 Ibid, Principle 15. 85 N. Brinham, ‘"Genocide cards": Rohingya refugees on why they risked their lives to refuse ID cards’, Open Democracy (October 2018) available at: https://www. opendemocracy.net/natalie-brinham/genocide-cards-why-rohingya-refugees-are-resisting-id-cards, [accessed 11/11/2020] 86 The Engine Room, ‘Understanding the Lived Effects of Digital ID: A Multi-Country Study’, (2020) available at: https://digitalid.theengineroom.org/assets/ pdfs/200123_FINAL_TER_Digital_ID_Report+Annexes_English_Interactive.pdf [accessed 13/11/2020] 87 UNHCR, ‘Joint Bangladesh/UNHCR verification of Rohingya refugees gets underway’ (2018) available at: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ briefing/2018/7/5b3f2794ae/joint-bangladeshunhcr-verificationrohingya-refugees-gets-underway.html [accessed 13/11/2020] 88 N. Brinham, ‘"Genocide cards": Rohingya refugees on why they risked their lives to refuse ID cards’, Open Democracy (October 2018) available at: https://www. opendemocracy.net/natalie-brinham/genocide-cards-why-rohingya-refugees-are-resisting-id-cards [accessed 11/11/2020]; The Engine Room, ‘Understanding the Lived Effects of Digital ID: A Multi-Country Study’ (2020) available at: https://digitalid.theengineroom.org/assets/pdfs/200123_FINAL_TER_Digital_ID_Report+Annexes_ English_Interactive.pdf [accessed 13/11/2020] 80 17