Rohingya data protection risks do not only flow from government biometric drives. An audit of UNHCR India’s operations in 2016 revealed that there were concerns that the agency was sharing refugee information with the government.64 This is concerning given the Indian Government’s efforts to expel the Rohingyas from the country. In October 2018 and January 2019, the Indian government forcibly deported a total of twelve Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, denying UNHCR access to these refugee detainees before they were refouled.65 Sharing biometric data with the Myanmar government would be a violation of several of India’s international obligations. Use of biometrics should be in compliance with international human rights standards on issues such as discrimination, privacy, legality and proportionality.70 There must be no diversion from these core standards due to the potential adverse impact on these vulnerable communities. Efforts to remove stateless persons often lead to situations of arbitrary indefinite detention in immigration detention centres and prisons.66 In this case, Myanmar accepted these Rohingya back under formal return arrangements. However, they have not accepted them back as citizens, but as residents who had to go through a national verification process. On return, they were issued with NVC cards,67 which are predominantly viewed by Rohingya as locking in long-term non-citizenship both for individuals and for Rohingya as a group.68 Intervening in a subsequent Supreme Court case on the intended mass forcible deportation of Rohingya to Myanmar, the Special Rapporteur on Racism stated as follows: “ The implementation of this order would amount to discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or descent and would rely on distinctions that have racially disparate effects. This order further contravenes India’s human rights obligations to protect vulnerable non-citizen populations from refoulement. Further, any migration decision of the Government should incorporate individualized due process protections. Until Myanmar ceases its violations of Rohingyas’ rights and undertakes acts sufficient to guarantee the safety and racial equality of the Rohingya people, return of Rohingyas to Myanmar will violate the principles of non-refoulement. 69 Office of the Internal Oversight Services (Internal Audit Division), ‘Audit of the Biometric Identity Management System at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’, Report 2016/181 (22 Dec 2016) 11 [downloadable online] accessed 13/11/2020] 65 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR deep concern at return of Myanmar nationals from India to Myanmar’ (2018) available at: https://www.unhcr.org/ph/14519-unhcr-deep-concernat-return-of-myanmar-nationals-from-india-to-myanmar.html [accessed 13/11202] 66 For more information about indefinite detentions in India see: Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Human Rights and Covid-19: What now for the Rohingya?’ (2020) available at: https://www.institutesi.org/resources/human-rights-and-covid-19-what-now-for-the-rohingya [accessed 13/11/2020] 67 Information provided by Rohingya activists based in India (names withheld). Copies of the NVCs issued to the refouled Rohingya were circulated on social media, resulting in alarm about the future legal status of Rohingya in Myanmar, and their protection status of Rohingya refugees outside Myanmar. 68 For more information on the NVC, see Chapter 4 of this paper, on Myanmar. 69 The UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, ‘Legal Opinion on India’s obligations under International Law to not deport Rohingyas’, (2019) Para 6, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/SR/Amicus/ AmicusBrieftoIndianSupremeCourt.pdf [accessed 13/11/2020] 70 L. Kingston, ‘Biometric Identification, Displacement, and Protection Gaps’ (2019) in, C. Maitland, Digital Lifeline? ICTs for Refugees and Displaced Persons, MIT Press 2018; See also, L. Moore ‘Governing by identity’ (2008) in, C. Bennett and D. Lyon (eds.), Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, security and identification in global perspective, Routledge 2008. 64 14