The Government of India granted LTVs to Rohingyas from 2012 onwards, based on their UNHCR Refugee Cards.³⁸ The granting of an LTV offered some protection against detention and deportation as ‘illegal migrants’. It also enabled Rohingyas to obtain other key identity documents and access certain basic rights and services. However, since 2016-17, existing LTVs have not been renewed and new ones have not been granted, with no official explanation as to why.³⁹ As the LTV has become essential for all refugees in India to gain access to an Aadhaar identity card, which in turn is a key piece of identification necessary to gain access to other basic rights and services,⁴⁰ the denial of the LTV has had a cascading effect. Service-access IDs Aadhaar is a single identity card linked to various benefits, services and facilities in India. It is the latest government iteration of the proposed ‘Multipurpose National Identity Card’, and a reflection of the state’s attempt to use technology to define citizenship and shape governance relations between the State and the individual.41 Enrolment numbers are the highest in relation to any other digital identity card in the world, and, as such, it has become an increasingly critical digital identity tool in India.42 Aadhaar records an individual’s iris scan, fingerprint scan, facial photograph, date of birth, sex, and address details, and provides the holder with a unique identification number.43 It is a proof of residence and does not denote citizenship or grant any rights per se, and so can be held by non-citizen residents who can furnish the required application identification. Aadhaar is also purported to be used as a non-mandatory verification marker for accessing benefits, services and facilities. However, this digital identification is increasingly required by private and public organisations for access to basic services, including higher education, jobs and personal or business banking.44 The level of personal data Aadhaar requires has raised concerns around privacy, discrimination and profiling, particularly in relation to its recording, storing, end-usage and sharing of data.45 Demands have emerged for a law addressing personal data protection.46 However, missing from these critiques are considerations of its implications for refugees and so-called “illegal migrants”. Since Aadhaar has become a primary identification document in India, it has also become an essential lifeline for refugees who often lack other identity documentation.47 Initially, refugees holding LTVs and the UNHCR Refugee Cards were issued Aadhaar cards.48 It was only in October 2018 that the Union Government’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) changed the policy and excluded Refugee Cards as valid documentation to obtain Aadhaar, which adversely affected those, such as the Rohingyas, whose LTVs were kept in abeyance and not renewed, or who were only granted UNHCR Refugee Cards and not LTVs.49 A. Roy, Mapping Citizenship in India (Oxford University Press 2010) 61 ³⁷ Y. Khan, The Great Partition: The making of Indian and Pakistan (Yale University 2017) 193-196. ³⁸ M. Morand and J. Crisp, ‘Destination Delhi: A review of the implementation of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in India’s capital city’ (2013) available at: https://www. refworld.org/docid/520a419a4.html [accessed 13/11/2020] ³⁹ Interview with Rohingya in Delhi, India, April 2017. (Name withheld); Interview with Rohingya, Hyderabad, India, August 2019 (name withheld). Research conducted by J. Field, A. Tiwari and Y. Mookherjee in Delhi in 2017 was funded by the International Institute for Environment and Development under the Urban Humanitarian Crisis theme. Research conducted by J. Field, A. Dutt Tiwari and M. Rajdev in Hyderabad in 2019 was funded by the British Academy, Award Reference: SDP2\100094, under the UK Government's Global Challenges Research Fund. ⁴⁰ Ministry of Home Affairs (Foreigners Division), ‘Long Term Visas’, MHA Doc No. 25022/62/2020-F-1 (13 Aug 2020) 10, available at: https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/ default/files/AnnexVILongTermvisas_20082020.pdf [accessed 23 Aug 2020]. ⁴¹ T. Mehmood, ‘India’s new ID card: Fuzzy logics, double meanings and ethnic ambiguities’ (2008), in C. Bennett & D. Lyon (eds.) Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, security and identification in global perspective, Routledge. 42 D. Dhillon, ‘Over 1.21 billion people are enrolled in the world’s largest biometric identification system’ (2016) available at: https://www.businessinsider.in/over-1-21-billionpeople-are-enrolled-in-the-worlds-largest-biometric-identification-system/articleshow/65009409.cms [accessed 13/11/2020] 43 UIDAI Website, available at: https://uidai.gov.in/what-is-aadhaar.html [accessed 13/11/2020] 44 A. Bhatia & J. Bhabha, ‘India’s Aadhaar scheme and the promise of inclusive social protection’ (2017) 45 Oxford Development Studies 1, available at: https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600818.2016.1263726 [accessed 13/11/2020] 45 K. Breckenridge, ‘Lineaments of Biopower: The Bureaucratic and Technological Paradoxes of Aadhaar’, (2019) 42 Journal of South Asian Studies 3, available at: https:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00856401.2019.1613080 [accessed 13/11/2020] 46 See, Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (Bill No. 373 of 2019) available at: http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/373_2019_LS_Eng.pdf [accessed 13/11/2020] 47 M. Morand and J.Crisp, ‘Destination Delhi: A review of the implementation of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in India’s capital city’, (2013) available at: https://www. unhcr.org/uk/research/evalreports/51f66e7d9/destination-delhi-review-implementation-unhcrs-urban-refugee-policy-indias.html [accessed 13/11/2020] 48 J. Field, A, Tiwari and Y. Mookherjee, ‘Urban refugees in Delhi: identity, entitlements and well-being’ (2017) available at: https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10852IIED.pdf [accessed 13/11/2020] 49 R. Kumar, UNHCR card holders not entitled for Aadhaar: MHA, Daily Pioneer (2018), available at https://www.dailypioneer.com/2018/india/unhcr-card-holders-notentitled-for-aadhaar--mha.html [accessed 13/11/2020] 36 11