“disappearances,” sexual violence, hundreds of cases of torture, and the wanton destruction of property. The victims of these attacks were, before General Guei’s flight, members both of Gbagbo’s FPI and of Ouattara’s RDR; once Guei had left the country, suspected members of the RDR, foreigners, and Muslims were the main victims. All the abuses went largely uninvestigated, with little hope of justice for the victims. President Gbagbo should have firmly brought the state security forces under control after assuming the presidency while taking steps to bring the perpetrators of the atrocities of October’s state-sponsored violence to justice. However he failed to do so. The December parliamentary elections were characterized by a further breakdown in the rule of law as state agents and their political supporters, encouraged by the impunity they enjoyed, perpetrated similar and in some cases worse acts of violence. While there were fewer killings, there were more cases of arbitrary detention, sexual violence, and religious persecution. Also, by December, the relationship between the security forces and the youth wing of Gbagbo’s party had consolidated, with the latter enjoying complete immunity, even when they committed atrocities in the presence of gendarmes and police. Although President Gbagbo did not initiate the descent into violence, for which General Guei must bear primary responsibility, he continued to use the same methods of incitement and ethnic polarization, and has failed to take credible steps to bring to justice the perpetrators of violent human rights crimes or to ensure that such abuses cannot be repeated. The state security forces—working first on behalf of military dictator General Robert Guei and, after he fled the country, on behalf of President Laurent Gbagbo—were responsible for the vast majority of serious abuses in both October and December. Within the security forces, the police and paramilitary gendarmes were most directly involved. The regular army largely stayed in its barracks apart from the Presidential Guard, most notably its elite Red Brigade, which committed abuses against protesters prior to the flight of General Robert Guei. Almost all of the reported killings by the security forces appeared to have been deliberate: in many cases there was evidence killings had been planned. Following the flight of General Guei, the youth wing of the FPI and vigilantes from ethnic groups aligned with President Gbagbo, including his own Bete ethnic group, often worked in coordination with and enjoyed the clear support of the security forces. These state-sanctioned civilian forces were also responsible for serious abuses including rape and murder. Victims were overwhelmingly presumed supporters of the RDR, which draws heavily on support from the largely Muslim north. Ivorians from the Dioula ethnic group in the north, Muslims, and foreigners were victimized for their perceived support for the RDR. Supporters of the RDR had taken to the streets, in often violent protests, to demonstrate against the disqualification of their leader, Alassane Ouattara, from running, first in the October presidential elections and later in the December parliamentary contest. As the violence took on religious and ethnic dimensions, security forces began targeting civilians less on the basis of their political affiliation than solely and explicitly on the basis of their religion, ethnic group, and/or perceived nationality. The violence surrounding the elections was founded on a trend in political discourse in which the concept of citizenship was central. Three successive presidents—Bédié, Guei, and Gbagbo—made the issue of nationality central to their parties’ political platforms. Since 1995, when President Bédié first invoked a conception of “Ivorité,” or “Ivorian-ness,” there have been several outbreaks of violence against foreigners. An estimated 26 percent of the population of Côte d’Ivoire is made up of immigrants, primarily from Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger. The agricultural sector is heavily reliant upon their labor. In 1999, tensions between ethnic Krumens from south-west Côte d’Ivoire and Burkinabé farmers, who for decades have been farming the coffee, cocoa, and palm nut plantations, resulted in the expulsion of some 8,000 to 12,000 Burkinabés.1 Nationalist 1 Radio France International, Paris, November 26, l999. Human Rights Watch 4 August 2001, Vol. 13, No. 6(A)