38 chapter one (ii) minorities seek to exercise individual rights while indigenous peoples seek to exercise collective rights, and (iii) minorities seek nondiscrimination while indigenous peoples seek self-government. Kymlicka points out, however, that these interpretations are not only stipulations in international legal texts but they also make claims about the aspirations of the two types of groups. For “if international norms accord different rights to minorities than to indigenous peoples, [then] this is because the two groups are presumed to want different kinds of rights” (Kymlicka 2008, 5). He argues that while these groups appear to differ very little in ‘objective’ characteristics, the distinction to be made between indigenous peoples and minorities is that of the nature of their political demands, rooted in their mode of organization and political aims. With this contention, the question of the types of ‘minority’ categori­ zations, their applicability and shortcomings arises. Important to keep in mind is that an analysis of power and the notion of oppression is hardly present in Kymlicka’s account of minority categorizations. Indeed, throughout most of his scholarly work, he is more interested in outlining the logics and structures of claims, obligations and inclusions provided to collectives placed in different legal categories; and in examining the possibility of whether liberal citizenship can coexist with or complement distinct rights and protections provided to ‘minority’ communities. With this intention, one of Kymlicka’s key scholarly contributions to the study of citizenship and its relation to the individual and collectives has been “the liberal mainstreaming of minority rights” so that such claims can be sourced in the “liberal principles on which existing institutions are built” (Joppke 2002, 247). Now, Kymlicka makes a distinction between old or homeland minorities and new minorities. The former were settled on their territory prior to it becoming part of a larger, independent country, have been settled within a particular part of that country for a long period of time, and, as a result of that historical settlement, have come to see that part of the country as their historical homeland. Conversely, the latter were admitted to a country as immigrants after it achieved legal sovereignty, and accorded a different legal status depending on the host society such as asylum seekers, temporary guest workers, illegal immigrants, and permanent immigrants (Kymlicka 2008, 7–9). For Kymlicka, an important distinction ought to be made within the category of old minorities between indigenous peoples and other historically settled homeland minorities, called national minorities. Yet, while it is of importance for many legal purposes, the distinction between indigenous peoples and national minorities is nevertheless