liberal pretence of a jewish state125 two identities. Whether in the form of the aforementioned legislation (see Chapter Two) severely limiting Arab political, social, cultural, mobility, family, and legal rights with the explicit intention of ‘preserving the Jewish character of the state’, or in the recently proposed and currently debated new Basic Law asserting that the identity of the state as Jewish ought to be preserved “in situations in which the Jewish character of the state clashes with its democratic character;” it is evident that the Knesset itself sees a tension.5 Proposed in August 2011, this legislation, supported by Kadima, Labour and Likud MKs, would amend the basic consensus regarding the character of the state, and make democratic rule inferior in principle to the state’s self-definition as the “national home for the Jewish people.”6 Now, Yakobson and Rubinstein hold that there is “no justification for seeing the shortcomings of Israeli democracy as proof that a Jewish state is by definition contrary to democratic principles” (Yakobson and Rubinstein 2009, 118). But the above political discourse and legislation indicates that, in actuality, the failures of Israeli democracy are directly attributable to the hierarchical incorporation regime resulting from the Jewish character of the state. Hence, it is not the case that “the only way to deny legitimacy to the concept of the Jewish state is to deny the Jewish people the right to statehood” (Yakobson and Rubinstein 2009, 97, repeated on 140). While this political line was adopted in 1947 by some of the states opposed to the Partition Plan, denial of Jewish entitlement to statehood is certainly not the basis of the majority of the criticisms Israel faces today. The notion of a Jewish state is rejected and criticized because the devastating practices mentioned above are necessitated to ensure Jewish domination. Put differently, it is the ideological, structural and institutional connection between the definition of Israel as a Jewish state, and policies and practices of oppression and discrimination that are legitimately discredited and held to be in violation of international legal norms. In the end, Yakobson and Rubinstein contend that “[t]he UN Partition Plan was doomed to failure by the Arab-Palestinian leadership and the countries of the Arab league, who rejected it and went to war” (Yakobson and Rubinstein 2009, 59). Here the Arab rejection is posited by the authors as a lack of compromise and cooperation that is contrasted with a Zionist desire for recognition and peaceful dialogue. In fact, and as numerous 5 Jonathan Lis, “Lawmakers seek to drop Arabic as one of Israel’s official languages,” Haaretz, August 4, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/lawmakers-seek-to -drop-arabic-as-one-of-israel-s-official-languages-1.376829. 6 Ibid.