On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness,… 315 justice debates articulated by Cecile Laborde and Miriam Ronzoni which they term ‘Republican Internationalism’ according to which Rules and institutions […] must be designed with the republican rationale of protecting free statehood, rather than replacing it with a full-blown cosmopolitan order. This is not a contradiction in terms, as republican freedom (of collective as well as individual agents) is obtained through non-domination rather than non-interference and is therefore compatible, in principle, with deep and extensive regulation. Non-dominated states, especially in a globalised world, are not states that enjoy unqualified Westphalian sovereignty.55 The basic ideal is the classic republican view that can be discerned behind Arendt’s own reflections, namely, that one can only be free if one is a free person, one can only be a free person in a free state, and that being a free person in a free state requires that one is a citizen of this state. To be free thus requires being a citizen. However, for a state to be free, it must be internally self-ruling and externally non-dominated. To be internally self-ruling in the membership aspect that concerns us, it must be the case that the citizenry is composed of all and only persons who are entitled to membership and choose (subject to requirement of being a citizen of a state) to acquire or not surrender this status. This is the condition of the legitimate determination of the ‘self’ of collective self-rule. The relevant ground of entitlement can be derived from the fact that individual freedom and collective freedom are linked in the republican conception. This is given contemporary expression in Bauböck’s ‘citizen stakeholder’ view which proposes that those and only those individuals have a claim to membership of a polity whose individual autonomy and wellbeing is linked to the collective self-government and flourishing of that polity.56 To be externally non-dominated in the membership aspect that concerns us, it must be the case that the states’ citizenship rules are subject only to general international rules that they are equal participants in shaping and that are designed to ensure that each and every human being is a citizen of a state and to link persons to states in ways that best serve the common interest. Being a self-ruling state is, on this republican view, entirely compatible with a global regime of regulation with respect to permissible state citizenship rules. More particularly, such a regime is a necessary condition of the de jure right to have nationality rights. Today we remain at some distance from establishing such a rightful condition even in the limited de facto sense that Arendt saw collapsing around her in early twentieth century Europe—and Arendt’s concerns with the fragility of our enjoyment of human rights, their dependence on secure nationality rights, remains a very live concern for us. Acknowledgements I am grateful to Catherine Allerton for discussion of her research on stateless children in Sabah, and to the referees and editors of NILR for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 55 56 Laborde and Ronzoni (2016), p. 281. See Bauböck (2015, 2017). 123