2021 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 3(2) This surmounts the problem discussed in Part II with s 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956, which seemingly limited the importation of English common law into Malaysian law to the law as it stood on 7 April 1956. 92 On this view, it is thus open to the courts to interpret the words in art 14(1) — ‘citizens by operation of law’ — as including customary international law through the transformative medium of English common law. This begs the question: what has been incorporated into English common law? Pham itself does not explicitly acknowledge Nottebohm or its principle, but rather seemingly adopts those factors into the reasonableness standard of judicial review in the context of that case. Further, such adoption can at best only be implied from Lord Mance’s judgment. We return to the contextual problem discussed at the beginning of this Part. Issues of diplomatic protection only arise on the international plane, and they have no analogue at the domestic level. To make the leap from diplomatic protection to citizenship acquisition would be to square a circle: as the second paragraph of Part IV explains, there is simply no equivalent domestic ground upon which the Nottebohm principle may take root, whether at English or Malaysian common law. A direct legal transplantation into Malaysian domestic law seems doomed to failure. However, this does not bar the courts from adopting the principle on a policy basis. As our three sources indicate, there is a cogent base to draw upon in recognising the principle. Our discussion in Part II shows that the principle aligns with the legislative intent behind the current citizenship provisions to ensure that only those with genuine ties to Malaysia acquire citizenship. We have also seen how the current test can subvert that intent by excluding some who fall within the remit of s 1(e) from citizenship. Adopting the principle in a modified test would address that issue and conform with Parliament’s intent. As such, there is at least an arguable case that a policy-based adoption should be considered by the courts. The progressive attitude of the Court of Appeal in Madhuvita towards the existing s 1(e) test suggests that such an adoption is not an impossibility, in the sense that the Court in that case engaged in a similar factual analysis to that adopted in our modified test. 93 As a matter of explicit adoption, however, the likelihood of this occurring is slim. On the one hand, Madhuvita remains the exception to the position adopted in the other leading cases. From a broader perspective, both the courts’ general lack of interaction with international law in general and the insulation of the Malaysian constitutional settlement vis-à-vis citizenship makes it unlikely that the Nottebohm principle will be called upon anytime soon. Yet there is surely some solace to be found in the fact that the door here is not entirely closed, and — as is the nature of the common law — the door may continue to edge open, each time with the slightest of increments. Recent obiter comments by the Federal Court also indicate that reference to foreign doctrines and jurisprudence in interpreting the Constitution is possible.94 Nottebohm may yet find its way to Malaysian shores. CONCLUSION Article 14(1)(b), when read together with sch II pt II s 1(e) of the Constitution, provides a safety net to persons born in Malaysia who would otherwise be 92 93 94 Civil Law Act 1956 (Malaysia) s 3(a). Madhuvita (n 43) [75]–[77]. Zaidi bin Kanapiah v ASP Khairul Fairoz bin Rodzuan [2021] 3 MLJ 759 [162]. 328