CCPR/C/125/D/2498/2014 6.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee notes the author’s claims in connection with the denial of the child budget on behalf of herself and Y under articles 23 (1) and 26, read in conjunction with articles 23 (1) and 24 (1), of the Covenant, and on behalf of Y under article 24 (1). The Committee also notes that the State party contests the author’s claim that she has exhausted all available domestic remedies, based on her pending appeal regarding her application for general child benefits. In this regard, the Committee notes the State party’s information that entitlement to the child budget is contingent upon on entitlement to general child benefits. The Committee observes, however, that the author had appealed the negative decision of the District Court of The Hague of 10 April 2013 concerning her application for general child benefits before she submitted the present communication on 17 September 2014. The Committee recalls that the requirement of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol to exhaust all available domestic remedies is not the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged. In the absence of information explaining the delay of over four years in processing the author’s appeal concerning general child benefits, the Committee considers that the application of that remedy has been unreasonably prolonged. It notes the author’s argument that, when rendering a final merits decision concerning the child budget application, the Council of State did not refer to the pending general child benefits application and did not consider it an obstacle to admissibility. Given these circumstances, the Committee considers that the sole fact that the author has not demonstrated entitlement to general child benefits does not preclude the Committee from examining her claims relating to entitlement to the child budget. Thus, in the absence of other objections from the State party regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author, the Committee considers that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol does not constitute a barrier to the admissibility of the aspects of the communication pertaining to the denial of the child budget to the author. 6.4 The Committee also notes the author’s claim under article 24 (3) of the Covenant that she and Y are unable to obtain a formal declaration that they are stateless. The Committee observes, however, that the author does not appear to have raised this claim before the domestic authorities. The Committee therefore considers that it is precluded by article 5 (2) (b) from examining the author’s claim under article 24 (3) of the Covenant. 6.5 The Committee considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated her claims on behalf of herself and Y under articles 23 (1) and 26, read in conjunction with articles 23 (1) and 24 (1), of the Covenant, and on behalf of Y under article 24 (1), for the purposes of admissibility. It therefore declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claims that, by rejecting her application for a child budget, the State party failed to provide measures of protection required by Y on account of her status as a minor under article 24 (1) of the Covenant. In this matter, the Committee is not called upon to decide generally upon the obligations of States parties to provide child benefits, nor does it decide the extent to which it is justified to limit entitlement to such benefits based on residency status. Rather, the Committee limits itself to the question of whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, the denial of the author’s application for the child budget violated Y’s rights under article 24 (1). 7.3 The Committee recalls that, under article 24, every child has a right to special measures of protection because of her or his status as a minor. 18 It also recalls that the principle that, in all decisions affecting a child, the child’s best interests shall be a primary 18 See the Committee’s general comment No. 17, para. 4, and Mónaco de Gallicchio v. Argentina (CCPR/C/53/D/400/1990), para. 10.5. 9