The authority here is quite broad. As long as the IJ designates a country of removal within the guidelines provided, the respondent does not have to be a citizen, national, or subject of the designated country, nor does the designated county have to provide prior consent for the removal.152 A functioning government is not required in the designated country,153 and multiple countries may be designated.154 For the stateless individual, if eventually ordered removed, this government authority could have a profound impact on the individual’s ability to exercise basic civil and political rights, take up work, and to access education and social services in the country of eventual removal. It may also result in the individual being subject to extended detention following an order of removal, as DHS may attempt to justify continued detention on the basis of one of these ongoing options. Any stateless individual subjected to this provision should challenge the removal if it would place her at risk of persecution, torture, or other serious human rights violations. She should also nonetheless challenge post-order detention, an issue which is discussed in further detail below. iii. Any Country Willing To Accept the Individual When the respondent cannot be removed to any of the countries mentioned above, DHS is permitted to seek removal to “another country whose government will accept the alien into that country.”155 This is the only potential country of removal where it is required that the government of the country of removal be willing to accept the individual.156 For the stateless individual, this broad Government removal authority is not without limit. Any stateless person subjected to this provision should have the opportunity to challenge removal to the country if it would place them at risk of persecution, torture, or other serious human rights violations. Resources Adam L. Fleming, Around the World in the INA: Designating a Country of Removal in Immigration Proceedings, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, (May 2013), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/03/vol7no5.pdf. Bejet-Viali Al-Jojo v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Jama, 543 U.S. 335); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.15(e). 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(f). 154 El Himri, 378 F.3d at 938 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c)). 155 See INA § 241(b)(2)(E)(vii). 156 See Execution of Removal Orders; Countries to Which Aliens May Be Removed, 70 Fed. Reg. 661, 666 (Jan. 5, 2005); see also Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Board erred in ordering a non-U.S. citizen—who was born in India to Tibetan parents—removed to China without evidence that China would accept him); El Himri, 378 F.3d at 934, 939 (holding that “stateless Palestinians who fled Kuwait” could not be removed to Jordan unless that country was willing to accept them). 152 153 34