E. Proving “Well-Founded Fear” of Persecution in the Absence of Individual Harm Because statelessness can arise out of actions attached to entire groups (e.g., the Rohingya), or due to state succession (e.g., the former Soviet Union), it can be difficult to demonstrate the requisite nexus. This subsection explores ways to demonstrate that fear of persecution is well-founded when a stateless person may not have experienced individualized harm. 1. Pattern or Practice of Persecution In general, an applicant for asylum does not need to demonstrate individualized harm when she or he can show a “reasonable possibility” of being “singled out individually for persecution” by showing: ! [A] pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality or, if stateless, in his or her country of last habitual residence, of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and ! The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.94 Note that evidence of changed circumstances may be insufficient to undermine an applicant’s claim when there is a strong and well-rooted “pattern or practice” of persecution.95 2. Membership in Disfavored Group In many circumstances, a stateless person may not experience individualized persecution; rather, the harm, including discrimination, barriers to the realization of basic rights, and even exploitation, may extend to her entire community. This type of group-based persecution can be used to demonstrate persecution more broadly if an individual shows that she belongs to this group.96 At least one court has recognized that absent a showing of individualized harm or a pattern or practice of harm, a member of a “disfavored group” may also demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution.97 In determining whether an applicant has established a well-founded fear of persecution based on membership in a disfavored group, the “court will look to (1) the risk level of membership in the group (i.e., the extent and the severity of persecution suffered by the group) and (2) the alien’s individual risk level (i.e., whether 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see, e.g., Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 192 (5th Cir.2004) (finding that the IJ erred in requiring Indonesian Christians to prove that they were singled out when the evidence indicated a pattern and practice of persecution of Christians); see also Rusak v. Holder, 734 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that “[w]hile Ms. Rusak’s own direct experiences in Belarus may not rise to the level of persecution on this ground as well, she is not required to demonstrate that she individually suffered persecution if she can establish a ‘pattern or practice ... of persecution of groups of persons similarly situated’ and that she is a member of the group ‘such that [her] fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.’” (citation omitted)). 95 See Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2004). 96 See, e.g., Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Christianity is a disfavored group in Indonesia and membership in that group, in conjunction with individualized risk of persecution, could give rise to a refugee claim). 97 See, e.g., El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended) (stateless Palestinians born in Kuwait); Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (ethnic Albanians in Kosovo); Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996) (Indo-Fijians). 94 20