As noted in the UNHCR RSD Handbook, the question of whether a stateless refugee can avail herself of the national protection of the “country of former habitual residence does not, of course, arise.”59 This is because by nature, stateless persons, due to their lack of a nationality, do not enjoy national protection of any State. It is also worth noting that “once a stateless person has abandoned the country of his former habitual residence for the reasons indicated in the [refugee] definition, he is usually unable to return.”60 While the definition of a refugee under U.S. law also includes stateless refugees, the provision does not specifically take into account the lack of national protection for stateless persons in their country of last habitual residence. Instead, U.S. law requires that all refugees, stateless or not, prove that they are both “unable or unwilling to return to . . . and . . . unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,” their country of nationality or, in the case of stateless people, country of last habitual residence.61 As such, stateless refugees in the United States must meet a different – perhaps higher – burden in proving eligibility for international protection than is contemplated under the 1951 Convention. In the context of an asylum claim based on statelessness, the fact that the 1951 Convention definition does not require stateless refugees to prove lack of national protection may itself be useful to support a finding of lack of national protection under U.S. asylum law. C. Persecution There is no universal definition of persecution under international law. Generally speaking, persecution involves threats to life or freedom, as well as other serious human rights violations, when on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.62 For purposes of asylum, the individual needs to prove past persecution or a “well-founded fear” of future persecution.63 Moreover, an individual may have been subject to measures that, taken on their own, do not rise to the level of persecution; however, when considered in a broader sociopolitical context, or even alongside other measures to which she was subjected, the cumulative circumstances may rise to the level of persecution.64 Under U.S. law, persecution has been broadly defined as the “infliction of harm or suffering by a government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the victim.”65 Such harm need not be physical or psychological, but can also include “the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life,” as long as the harm inflicted is so severe that it rises to the level of persecution.66 Moreover, some courts have recognized the cumulative effect of circumstances that by themselves are not persecution but may, when considered collectively, rise to the level of persecution.67 While courts do not consider statelessness persecution per se, the circumstances under which someone was rendered stateless, as well as the effects of statelessness, are relevant to the persecution element of the UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 50, at ¶101. Id. 61 INA §101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). 62 UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 50, at ¶¶51-52. 63 See INA 101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). 64 UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 50, at ¶53. 65 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996). 66 Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N Dec. 163, 169-71 (BIA 2007). 67 See, e.g., Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the cumulative effect of a series of abuses rose to the level of persecution). 59 60 15