533US2
Unit: $U87
[10-21-02 18:35:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 533 U. S. 678 (2001)
693
Opinion of the Court
Although Mezei, like the present cases, involves indefinite
detention, it differs from the present cases in a critical respect. As the Court emphasized, the alien’s extended departure from the United States required him to seek entry
into this country once again. His presence on Ellis Island
did not count as entry into the United States. Hence, he
was “treated,” for constitutional purposes, “as if stopped
at the border.” Id., at 213, 215. And that made all the
difference.
The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry
into the United States and one who has never entered runs
throughout immigration law. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S.
228, 230 (1925) (despite nine years’ presence in the United
States, an “excluded” alien “was still in theory of law at the
boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United
States”); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185, 188–190
(1958) (alien “paroled” into the United States pending admissibility had not effected an “entry”). It is well established
that certain constitutional protections available to persons
inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of
our geographic borders. See United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 269 (1990) (Fifth Amendment’s protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 784 (1950)
(same). But once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies
to all “persons” within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary,
or permanent. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 210 (1982);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596–598, and n. 5 (1953); Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886); cf. Mezei, supra, at 212
(“[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process
of law”). Indeed, this Court has held that the Due Process